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Summary
This paper seeks to highlight the early modern scholastic contribution to dealing with the issue 
of pre-contractual duties to inform. Bringing together different strands of thought, ranging from 
Aristotelian philosophy to Roman law, the 16th and 17th century scholastics developed adequate 
analytical tools to solve legal and moral problems arising from information disparities between 
contracting parties. While first looking at the different classical and medieval texts that shaped 
the early modern debate, this paper then goes on to give a systematic account of how the early 
modern scholastics dealt with duties of disclosure about both intrinsic and extrinsic defects in 
the merchandise. A final chapter looks at how the early modern scholastic debate was received 
in the Northern natural law school, before concluding that the early modern scholastics took a 
surprisingly negative attitude towards duties to inform. 
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1. – Introduction 
In a recent volume, Mistake, fraud and duties to inform in European contract 
law, case studies taken from different countries highlight how important the 
pre-contractual duty of the seller to disclose the necessary information con-
cerning his merchandise has become in most European jurisdictions. A case 
in point is the Dutch Civil Code (1992), which considers the information 
provided by the seller as determinative for the expectations of the purchaser 
(art. 7:17 BW), and concludes that non-conformity lies if, eventually, the 
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object sold does not meet those expectations (art. 7:21 BW ff.)1. The seller 
is then considered not to have fulfilled his duties of disclosure. The editor of 
that volume, Ruth Sefton-Green, wonders whether the strong emphasis on 
the seller’s duty to inform should be seen as a shift from formal validity to 
contractual fairness: is the contemporary law of sale characterized by a turn 
towards substantial, equitable standards? Is it leaving behind the rather formal, 
and minimal standards required in the civilian tradition2?
Interestingly, the volume edited by Sefton-Green also contains a chapter 
dealing with the historical roots of the contemporary debate on duties to 
inform. In this respect, Martin Josef Schermaier points out the importance 
of early modern scholastic doctrine and case-law for the development of our 
present-day concepts of mistake and duties of disclosure. Schermaier recalls 
how the theologians’ grappling with a case known as the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, 
as well as their more theoretical discussions about intrinsic defects in the 
merchandise shaped the debates3. The ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ questions the 
seller’s duty to disclose his knowledge about future market conditions that 
are thought to be much more advantageous to the buyer than the current 
conditions. Contrary to the great lawyer and orator Marcus Tullius Cicero 
(106–43 BC) who initiated the debate in his work De officiis (On duties), 
the early modern scholastics conclude that the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ does 
not have a duty of disclosure. His personal knowledge that the market-price 
will shortly decrease is not a defect in the merchandise itself, but a defect in 
the circumstances under which the sale is concluded. Hence no duty of 
disclosure exists. Moreover, whether intrinsic defects invariably give rise to 
a pre-contractual duty to inform, is in itself not easy to answer, as will appear 
below.
It is the aim of this paper to investigate the most vivid discussions on the 
duties to inform about intrinsic as well as extrinsic defects surrounding the 
object of sale in early modern scholasticism.
First we will highlight the classical and patristic origins of the debate in 
Aristotle (384–322 BC), Cicero, the Corpus Iustinianeum, and Saint Ambrose 
(339–397). Indispensable, too, is an overview of the seminal contributions 
made by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313–1357), 
Gabriel Biel (1418–1495), and Konrad Summenhart (1455–1502) in the 
1 The subject has also a topical interest in view of the forthcoming debate concerning the 
‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament on Consumer Rights’ (SEC/2008/2544) 
and its subsequent implementation in the near future.
2 See R. Sefton-Green, General introduction, in: R. Sefton-Green (ed.), Mistake, fraud and 
duties to inform in European contract law, [The common core of European private law, 5], 
Cambridge 2005, p. 6–17. Cf. also M.J. Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums 
von den Glossatoren bis zum BGB, [Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte, 29], Wien 
etc. 2000, p. 124–143. 
3 See Schermaier, Mistake, misrepresentation and precontractual duties to inform, the civil tradition, 
in: R. Sefton-Green (ed.), Mistake (supra, n. 2), p. 44–45 and p. 55–56.
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later Middle Ages. As regards early modern scholasticism itself, however, a 
twofold limitation has thrust itself upon us, taking into account the great 
number of authors participating in the early modern scholastic movement as 
well as the wide range of their treatments of duties to inform.
For the first half of the sixteenth century we have focussed on the philosopher 
John Mair (ca. 1469–1550), who taught in Paris, and the Dominican theo-
logians Francisco de Vitoria (1483/1492–1546), and Domingo de Soto 
(1494–1560), who dominated the debate in Salamanca. To broaden the 
background, we have also included the Franciscan friar Antonio de Córdoba 
(1485–1578), Juan de Medina (1490–1546), who was a dissonant voice from 
Alcalá de Henares, the canonist and bishop Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva 
(1512–1577), and the Augustinian friar Pedro de Aragón (ca. 1545–1592). 
For the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, 
as the Jesuits take the leading role in developing early modern scholastic 
moral and legal thought, we have selected Gregorio de Valencia (1549–1603), 
Luís de Molina (1535–1600), Lenaert Leys (Leonardus Lessius) (1554–1623), 
and Juan de Lugo (1583–1660)4.
As to the contents of the debate, we have restricted ourselves to one specific 
intrinsic defect, namely the defect – known to the seller – in the quality of 
the merchandise, and to one specific extrinsic defect – also known to the 
seller –, namely the circumstance that the market-price may shortly be expected 
to decrease. 
2. – The Classical and Medieval heritage
2.1. – Greek, Roman, and patristic sources
Typically, the early modern scholastics drew on a number of intellectual 
traditions in order to address the problem of pre-contractual duties to inform. 
Although they often express their thoughts as an explicit commentary on 
Thomas Aquinas, it is obvious that through their intellectual father’s thinking 
they were first and foremost imbued with Aristotelian notions of justice in 
exchange and voluntariness as one of the foundations of moral action.
In Book III of his Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle develops the argument 
that man is responsible for his acts only to the extent that he acts freely and 
in the absence of ignorance or compulsion. Accordingly, mistake and duress 
undermine free human action. Whatever is done by virtue of ignorance is 
not voluntary. Moreover, a person can be blamed or praised only for actions 
that he performs voluntarily. So a man is not responsible for his actions if he 
4 Succinct bio-bibliographical information on these as well as other scholastic authors (period 
from ca. 1500 to 1800) is now available on Jacob Schmutz’s (Université Paris-IV Sorbonne) 
website: www.scholasticon.fr.
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is carried away by a hurricane. But what about a captain who throws his goods 
overboard in a storm in order to save the crew? At the moment of action, he 
definitely wishes to jettison cargo, but he would definitely not have wished 
to do so in the abstract. So there is also a category of actions that are mixed5. 
Aristotle seems to conclude that such forced acts are nevertheless voluntary 
acts. Thomas Aquinas carries this further and in his Summa Theologiae says 
that the captain acted voluntarily simpliciter, that is, here and now, and 
involuntarily secundum quid, that is, as such apart from the actual circum-
stances6.
Aristotle added some further grist to the mill of future discussions on 
voluntary consent in book V of his Nichomachean Ethics, where he asserts 
that ‘no one is treated unjustly, if he consents’7. It is echoed in Roman law, 
for instance in D. 47,10,1,5, where it is stated that ‘that is no injury which 
is done to one who consents (nulla iniuria est quae in volentem fiat)’ and in 
D. 39,3,9,1 (nullam enim potest videri iniuriam accipere qui semel voluit). Yet 
it would be naive to jump to the conclusion that Aristotle laid the foundations 
of the modern principle of contract law to the effect that will is a sufficient 
condition of justice. In the same book V we find Aristotle developing a theory 
of justice in voluntary and involuntary transactions, which indeed stresses 
the need for equilibrium (contrapassum). Among voluntary transactions he 
puts contracts, among involuntary actions what today pertains to the law of 
delict or to criminal law. In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas denotes justice 
in voluntary transactions as commutative justice (iustitia commutativa) and 
uses aequalitas to render the Greek word for equilibrium in Latin. In this 
manner, the foundations of the scholastic doctrine on justice in contractual 
exchange were laid. The Aristotelian-Thomistic principle of justice implies 
that in case of defective merchandise the selling price should correspond to 
the defective quality of the object sold.
A second authoritative tradition is that of Roman law, certainly in its 
Medieval form. It should be noted, first, that the Corpus Iustinianeum contains 
a case which, when combined with considerations of Aristotelian equality 
and justice in exchange, would give rise to the doctrine of the just price and 
the doctrine of laesio enormis as found in the writing of the scholastics and 
canonists of the later Middle Ages. In C. 4,44,2 a seller suffers prejudice 
because his real estate is sold for less than half of the normal price. The buyer 
is then expected to pay the rest of the price, or to make restitution of the 
5 See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 3, 1, 1110a4–19. We consulted the following edition: 
Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit I. Bywater, 
[Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis], Oxonii 197015 [=1894], p. 40–41.
6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, quaest. 6, art. 6, resp. We consulted the following 
edition: Prima Secundae Summae Theologiae a quaestione 1 ad quaestionem 70, in: Thomae 
Aquinatis opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII edita, tom. 6, Romae 1891, p. 61.
7 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (supra, n. 5), 5, 11, 1138a12, p. 112.
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estate. The notion of just price (pretium justum) is mentioned in this connection 
not to protect a buyer, however, but to protect a poor seller8. Moreover, the 
buyer is liable not for simple but for extreme prejudice.
In the Middle Ages this passage from the Codex was applied more generally 
to all types of cases where either a seller or a buyer was deceived. Thus was 
born a general doctrine holding that deceit for more than half of the just 
price amounted to great prejudice (laesio enormis)9. While the civilians insisted 
that an action on laesio enormis could only lie if the price exceeded more than 
half of the just price10, the canonists and early modern scholastics considered 
any deviation from the just price as a sin against the virtue of justice11. Even 
though from the civilians’ point of view a buyer could not always justify 
rescission on the basis of C. 4,44,2, there was still the possibility to sue the 
seller on account of latent defects. At least if the seller could be assumed to 
have known or to have had a duty to know about these latent defects. According 
to Roman law, this knowledge in the pre-contractual stage would have resulted 
in full contractual liability (under the actio empti), that means for all damages 
including consequential losses12.
Yet another technical distinction, constructed on the basis of Roman 
legal sources, needs mentioning here: the distinction between two kinds of 
deceit, viz. dolus causam dans contractui and dolus incidens in contractum. This 
distinction was developed through a confusion, once more of the Corpus 
Iustinianeum and Aristotelian philosophical terminology in the Middle Ages 
on the basis of D. 4,3,7pr. It was developed by the Bolognese glossators and 
8 That Justinian did not mean to establish a general doctrine of just pricing is argued, also with 
reference to the historical context, in R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations, Roman foundations 
of the civilian tradition, Cape Town 1990, p. 259–268.
9 See J.W. Baldwin, The Medieval theories of the just price: romanists, canonists and theologians 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 49 
(1959), p. 3–92; and K.S. Kahn, Roman and Frankish origins of the just price of medieval Roman 
and Canon Law, New York 1973.
10 See the gloss Iudicis ad C. 4,44,2.
11 The just price should not be considered a static or objective standard, however, as Johann 
Gottlieb Heineccius (1681–1741) wrongly thought the scholastics held it to be. In the early 
modern scholastic conception, the just price is simply the market price under competitive 
circumstances, or the price set by the public authorities taking into account market factors like 
scarcity and abundance; cf. O. Langholm, The legacy of scholasticism in economic thought: 
antecedents of choice and power, Cambridge 1998, p. 77–99.
12 See D. 19,1,13pr. and D. 19,1,6,4. The early modern scholastics, however, pay more attention 
to the aedilitian remedies of Roman law, which could only be used during a limited time for 
rescission (actio redhibitoria) or price reduction (actio quanti minoris), not for all damages. This 
may be due to the fact that in his Quodl. II q. 5 art. 2, Thomas Aquinas speaks about the 
provisions of civil law in case of an animal morbosum. Cf. Quaestiones de quolibet, in: Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, tom. 25, vol. 2, Parisiis–
Romae 1996, p. 228–229. The word morbosus is reminiscent of the morbus of animals, literally 
mentioned in the texts of the aedilitian edicts. See D. 21,1,1,1 and D. 21,1,38. 
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we find it in Azo († 1220)13 as well as in the Ordinary Gloss of Accursius 
(ca.1182–1263). When the buyer would not have bought the object at all if 
he had known of the defect, there was dolus dans causam contractui. He was 
deceived in the essentialia of the sale. As a consequence such a sale was void. 
When the buyer, however, still would have bought the object, when he had 
known the defect, albeit for a lower price, there was dolus incidens. He was 
deceived in the accidentalia of the sale. The contract was valid, although the 
buyer could claim damages14.
A third strain of thought, in addition to the Aristotelian and the Roman 
law tradition, which runs through the early modern scholastics’ debates, stems 
from De officiis, a work of Cicero on moral philosophy, written around 
44 B.C. Certainly, with regard to the discussions on the duty to disclose 
information about external circumstances to a contract, Cicero’s De officiis 
proved to be vital in that it contained the case of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’15. 
The story goes as follows. An honest merchant is shipping grain from Alexandria 
to the island of Rhodes, where prices have raced up and people are dying 
from starvation. At the same time, he knows that many more grain merchants 
are setting forth to Rhodes. They will be arriving there in the near future. 
The qualm of conscience he faces is whether or not he is morally obliged to 
disclose his information about the additional relief which is on its way. If he 
does, he fears that he will fail to make huge profits. If he does not, the wretched 
buyer will suffer damage16. In fact, this case is set against the background of 
Cicero’s larger, and typically Stoic discussion about the wrongfully perceived 
antithesis between the morally right (honestum) and the expedient (utile).
Cicero tackles the problem of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ as well as duties 
to inform about intrinsic defects in an attempt to show that it is a mistake 
to believe that dishonesty and morally irresponsible behaviour are the neces-
sary prerequisites for material success. In his view, honesty leads to honour 
13 See, e.g., Azo, Summa Codicis, ad C. 4,49, Lugduni 1559, f. 111va, num. 21–23.
14 Further literature: Zimmermann, The law of obligations (supra, n. 8), p. 670–677; A. Wacke, 
Circumscribere, gerechter Preis und die Arten der List (Dolus bonus und dolus malus, dolus causam 
dans und dolus incidens) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der §§ 138 Abs. II und 123 BGB, 
Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, Rom. Abt., 94 (1977), p. 184–246.
15 Cicero’s discussion of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ was studied against the background of 
Roman sales law by D. Waibel, Aufstieg und ‘Fall’ des alexandrinischen Getreidehändlers, Ausgewählte 
Informationsprobleme beim Kauf von Cicero bis Savigny, in: M. Ascheri e.a. (eds.), Ins Wasser 
geworfen und Ozeane durchquert, Festschrift für Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Köln–Weimar–Wien 
2003, p. 1057–1074. Contrary to what the title of this contribution might suggest, it does not 
contain a single reference to the vast reception of the case in the late Medieval, Renaissance, 
or early modern period. As to its reception in humanist authors like Caspar Barlaeus (1584–1648) 
in the Netherlands, see W. Decock, Leonardus Lessius en de koopman van Rhodos, Een schakelpunt 
in het denken over economie en ethiek, De Zeventiende Eeuw, 22 (2006), p. 247–261. 
16 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 12, 50. We consulted the following edition: Cicéron, Les devoirs, livres 
II et III, texte établi et traduit par M. Testard, [Collection des Universités de France], Paris 
1970, p. 96.
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(honor), with honour being the very basis of utility (utilitas). But you cannot 
lead an honourable life unless you take into account other people’s interests, 
and are perceived to do so. After all, even on an etymological level, there is 
an unmistakable connection between the Latin words for moral decency 
(honestas), and reputation (honor). Therefore, even if the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ 
is aiming at expediency, he should not think that he will be better off by 
availing himself of his private information to the detriment of his fellow 
human beings. For then his reputation will be ruined. 
Thus Cicero makes the case for a very large duty of disclosure. He takes 
the view of the Stoic philosopher Antipater of Sion that the buyer should not 
remain uninformed about any detail the seller knows, because the seller was 
born in this world as a member of a social community which naturally binds 
all people together (inter homines natura coniuncta societas), and the interests 
of whom he should serve and equate with his own interest17. On the other 
hand, Cicero is said – in the Thomistic tradition – to believe with Diogenes 
of Babylonia that it would be absurd for a seller to think he is bound to send 
a messenger through the streets publicly crying out that the house he is selling 
is unhealthy18. In fact, Cicero expressly disagrees with Diogenes of Babylonia, 
when he finds him defending the case of a very thin morality, namely asserting 
that a seller is allowed to look after his own interest as long as positive law 
does not expressly urge him to disclose his information to the buyer19. According 
to Diogenes, the seller can abide by the market price, although he is not 
allowed to misrepresent market circumstances. Moreover, Diogenes makes 
a distinction between expressly concealing information that could be important 
for the other party to the contract, and simply keeping silent about his 
information20.
Yet Cicero, considering expediency and morality to be synonymous, 
demanded higher moral standards from businessmen. Not only was expressly 
trying to conceal information, let alone lying, morally objectionable in Cicero’s 
eyes, but also merely keeping silent about defects21. For would not the ‘Mer-
chant of Rhodes’, would not a proprietor who does not disclose his informa-
tion about the unhealthy state of the house he is trying to sell be considered 
a man who is sly, underhand and grown old in fraud, Cicero asks? And is not 
this ill reputation contrary to expediency22?
In his Christian adaptation of Cicero’s De officiis, St. Ambrose of Milan, 
writing in approximately 388 A.D., points out the weaknesses in his pagan 
predecessor’s argument, while at the same time strengthening his case for a 
17 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 12, 53, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 16), p. 98.
18 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 13, 55, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 16), p. 99.
19 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 12, 51, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 16), p. 97.
20 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 13, 57, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 16), p. 99.
21 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 14, 58, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 16), p. 100.
22 Cicero, De officiis, 3, 13, 57, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 16), p. 100.
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very large duty of disclosure of both internal and external circumstances to 
a purchase-sale contract23. Referring to Plato’s imaginative story, known as 
‘The ring of Gyges’24, about the effects of invisibility on moral behaviour, 
Ambrose lays bare the shame culture underlying pagan ethics. What is the 
force of Cicero’s plea for the identification of expediency and honesty, if one’s 
honour cannot be tainted by immoral behaviour, as is the case with Gyges, 
who is rendered invisible by the ring he wears? Christianity has much more 
argumentative force, says Ambrose. For a Christian is still left with the inner 
voice of conscience which can condemn him for acting immorally regardless 
of whether the shameful act was seen by other persons or not. A Christian is 
his own accuser25. In fact, what we are witnessing here is the birth of conscience. 
It is the development of this conscience, conceived of as a court, the mechanisms 
and extent of which we will be able to observe in the works of the early 
modern scholastics.
Nevertheless, as a rule the scholastics reacted fiercely against Ambrose’s 
diatribe against speculative commercial activities. In a highly rhetorical piece 
of writing, Ambrose depicted and indeed destroyed the image of businessmen 
who prided themselves on their unflagging zeal and prudence in making large 
fortunes through speculation26. In addition, Ambrose mentions, though 
tongue in cheek, that these businessmen claim support for their speculative 
activities from the Bible, and from Genesis 40 in particular, where Joseph is 
said to have bought up all grain stocks in Egypt on account of his knowledge 
of future shortages. Ambrose, however, sharply refutes those arguments, 
saying that Joseph had for his part not intended to make money through 
speculation, but to ensure sustained provisions of grain to the whole population. 
Moreover, Ambrose holds that profits made through speculation always 
lead to the detriment of the commonwealth, calling this so-called ‘art of 
23 An interesting, and comparative study of Cicero’s and Ambrose’s De officiis is M. Becker, 
Die Kardinaltugenden bei Cicero und Ambrosius: De officiis, [Chrêsis, Die Methode der Kirchenväter 
im Umgang mit der antiken Kultur, 4], Basel 1994, esp. p. 213–227 on the third book.
24 See Plato, Republic, 2, 3, 359b–360d. We consulted the following edition: Platon, La 
république, livres I–III, texte établi et traduit par E. Chambry avec introduction d’A. Diès, in: 
Platon, Oeuvres complètes, [Collection des Universités de France], Paris 1947, tom. 6, p. 52–
53.
25 Ambrose, De officiis, 3, 5, 29, in: Ambrose, Les devoirs, livres II et III, texte établi et traduit 
par M. Testard, [Collection des Universités de France], Paris 1992, p. 93–94: ‘Nihil agit sapiens 
nisi quod cum sinceritate, sine fraude sit ; neque quidquam facit in quo se crimine quoquam 
obliget etiamsi latere possit. Sibi enim est reus priusquam ceteris nec tam pudenda apud eum 
publicatio flagitii quam conscientia est’.
26 In Ambrose, De officiis, 3, 6, 39, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 25), p. 99, we find the businessmen 
claiming the following against their detractors: ‘Num industria in crimen vocatur? Num 
diligentia reprehenditur? Num providentia vituperatur?’. This is exactly the kind of argument 
put forward by the scholastics of the early modern period to defend the Merchant of Rhodes’ 
right not to disclose information about future market conditions.
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 profit-making through speculation and industry’ nothing less than robbery 
and theft27.
To conclude, in sharing Cicero’s bias against trade and commerce, Ambrose 
sharply opposes the business man’s wisdom of the flesh to divine wisdom. 
Against the background of the renaissance of cities and commerce from the 
12th century onwards, his younger Christian colleagues would be urged to 
take a more nuanced view.
2.2. – Late Medieval discussions from Aquinas to Summenhart
2.2.1. – Intrinsic defects
There is hardly any authoritative work with stronger influence on the early 
modern scholastic tradition than Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, which 
in the early sixteenth century replaced the Sententiae of Peter Lombard (ca. 
1100–1160) as a textbook for theology students throughout Europe. In the 
part of this magnum opus mainly dealing with moral theological and legal 
issues, and known as the Secunda secundae, Aquinas tackles the question of 
defects in the quality of the merchandise (quaestio 77, article 3). This was 
probably written between 1270 and 1272. As stated above, intrinsic defects 
in the merchandise are those defects which by themselves are determinative 
for the just price. We will focus on one of these, namely defects in the qual-
ity (qualitas), and the question of whether or not the seller has a duty to 
disclose them. These defects – often specifically denoted in Latin by the term 
vitia at least from Vitoria’s commentary on Aquinas onwards – should be 
distinguished from defects in the substance (species), on the one hand (namely 
those concerning the essence of the object sold) and defects in the quantity 
(quantitas), on the other (namely those concerning the number, weight or 
measure of the merchandise)28. Regarding the question whether or not the 
seller is obliged to disclose the defects in the quality, various ideas, handed 
down from the past, were relevant. First, Aquinas adopts a distinction deriv-
ing from Roman law (D. 21,1,14,10) between latent and patent defects. In 
the case of visible, apparent defects (vitia manifesta), such as a horse with one 
eye, there is no need to mention it to the buyer as long as the selling price is 
in conformity with the defective merchandise – a conclusion which no doubt 
derives from Aristotle’s idea of equality in exchange. In the case of latent 
defects (vitia occulta), a duty of disclosure only exists if they cause harm 
(damnum) – as when the buyer pays too high a price – or if they cause risk 
( periculum) – as when the house sold is falling into ruins, the horse is lame 
27 Ambrose, De officiis, 3, 6, 44, (ed. Testard, supra, n. 25), p. 102.
28 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, quaest. 77, art. 2, concl. We consulted the 
following edition: Secunda Secundae Summae Theologiae a quaestione 57 ad quaestionem 122, 
in: Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII edita, tom. 9, Romae 1897, 
p. 150–151.
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or food is contaminated. Otherwise the seller may keep silent about the latent 
defects as long as the price is in accordance with the defective state of the 
thing sold. This idea may be prompted by the fact that buyers are familiar 
with the market prices and can perceive a reduced price as a quality indica-
tor29:
I reply that it is always illicit to cause harm or risk to another person, although it 
is not necessary for a human being always to provide his fellow man with help 
and advice to the latter’s advantage. That is only necessary in some specific situa-
tions, for example when the other is submitted to his care, or when there is no 
other person who can help him. Now, the seller who offers something for sale, 
causes the buyer harm or risk by the mere fact that he offers him something 
defective, if that defect can result in harm or danger. The seller causes harm when 
the thing offered for sale actually needs to be priced much lower on account of 
its defect, but he does not reduce the price. The seller causes risk if on account of 
its defect the use of the thing is impossible or dangerous, for example, when 
someone sells a lame horse as if it were fleet of foot, or a dilapidated house as if 
it were solid, or contaminated food as if it were good. So whenever such defects 
are latent and the seller does not disclose them, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, 
and he will be obliged to pay damages. If, however, a defect is apparent, for instance 
when a horse has only one eye, or if a thing is still likely to be useful to other 
persons though it is not any longer to the seller himself, no duty of disclosure 
exists provided that the seller reduces the price in accordance with the seriousness 
of the defect. For otherwise the buyer would wish the price to be reduced further 
than is necessary. Consequently, it is allowed for a seller to secure his own protection 
by not disclosing the defect in his merchandise.
Aquinas had dealt with a similar question a few years earlier, probably in 
the Advent of 1269, in quodlibetal question II, quaest. 5, art. 2. Yet there 
29 See Thomas Aquinas, IIaIIae (ed. Leonina, supra, n. 28), quaest. 77, art. 3, concl., p. 152: 
‘Respondeo dicendum quod dare alicui occasionem periculi vel damni semper est illicitum: 
quamvis non sit necessarium quod homo alteri semper det auxilium vel consilium pertinens 
ad eius qualemcumque promotionem, sed hoc solum est necessarium in aliquo casu determinato, 
puta cum alius eius curae subdatur, vel cum non potest ei per alium subvenire. Venditor autem, 
qui rem vendendam proponit, ex hoc ipso dat emptori damni vel periculi occasionem quod 
rem vitiosam ei offert, si ex eius vitio damnum vel periculum incurrere possit: damnum quidem, 
si propter huiusmodi vitium res quae vendenda proponitur minoris sit pretii, ipse vero propter 
huiusmodi vitium nihil de pretio subtrahat; periculum autem, puta si propter huiusmodi vitium 
usus rei reddatur impeditus vel noxius, puta si aliquis alicui vendat equum claudicantem pro 
veloci, vel ruinosam domum pro firma, vel cibum sive venenosum pro bono. Unde si huiusmodi 
vitia sint occulta et ipse non detegat, erit illicita et dolosa venditio, et tenetur venditor ad damni 
recompensationem. Si vero vitium sit manifestum, puta cum equus est monoculus; vel cum 
usus rei, etsi non competat venditori, potest tamen esse conveniens aliis; et si ipse propter 
huiusmodi vitium subtrahat quantum oportet de pretio: non tenetur ad manifestandum vitium 
rei. Quia forte propter huiusmodi vitium emptor vellet plus subtrahi de pretio quam esset 
substrahendum. Unde potest licite venditor indemnitati suae consulere, vitium rei reticendo’.
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the distinction between latent and patent defects is lacking. Nor is the possible 
danger for the buyer mentioned. Aquinas merely states that defects do not 
have to be disclosed as long as the price corresponds to the defective nature 
of the thing sold.
Two late Medieval theologians, steeped in the Thomistic tradition, also 
exercised a considerable influence on the doctrines of the early modern scho-
lastics. Both taught theology at the recently founded University of Tübingen 
(1477).
The first is Gabriel Biel, who in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter 
Lombard, first rephrases the teachings of Aquinas from the Summa Theologiae. 
He writes that in the case of latent defects it is allowed to conceal them, if 
that does not cause the buyer to suffer injury or run risks. The reason is that, 
otherwise, the buyer wants to pay even less than the just price, and, as Aquinas 
states, the seller may justly secure his own protection. Biel then continues 
and refers to the following distinction. Firstly, it is not allowed to keep silent 
about defects if the buyer would not have bought at all, had he known of 
these defects. For another, a seller is allowed to conceal defects if the buyer 
would have bought the merchandise regardless, albeit it for a lower price, as 
long as the seller adjusts the selling-price to the defective quality30. Although 
Biel ascribes this distinction merely to the canonist Abbas Panormitanus 
(1386–1445)31 and the Italian Franciscan Angelo Carletti de Chivasso (ca. 
1414–1495)32, it is definitely reminiscent of the Glossators’ subdivision of 
deceit into dolus causam dans and dolus incidens.
The other Tübingen professor of theology is Konrad Summenhart, usually 
referred to as Conradus. Unlike Gabriel Biel, he is frequently quoted in the 
teachings of the early modern scholastics on qualitative defects. In his influential 
work De contractibus licitis atque illicitis, Summenhart deals extensively with 
the sale of defective merchandise and the seller’s obligation to inform the 
buyer. He holds that a seller in good faith is not liable for any of the intrinsic 
defects, namely those in the substance, the quality and the quantity. His 
ignorance should not imply a gross mistake (crassa), however, and it is not 
allowed to deliberately sell something defective. In this context, Summenhart 
draws a distinction, resembling that of Biel just mentioned, and corresponding 
with the difference between the Roman actio redhibitoria and actio quanti 
minoris, viz. between the situation where the buyer wants to restore the object 
in exchange for the price upon noticing the defect, and the event in which 
he merely claims reduction of the price. In the latter case he was willing to 
30 G. Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, lib. 4, pars 2 (dist. 15–22), (ed. 
W. Werbeck / U. Hofmann), Tübingen 1977, dist. 15, quaest. 10, art. 3, dub. 1, p. 206–207.
31 Abbas Panormitanus (Nicolaus de Tudeschis), Commentaria in tertium decretalium librum, 
[Opera Omnia, tom. 6], ad X. 3, 19, 4,Venetiis 1588, f. 141ra, num. 2.
32 Angelo Carletti de Chivasso, Summa angelica de casibus conscientiae, [s.l.] 1520, s.v. emptio 
et venditio, f. 65rb–65va, n. 8.
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buy the object, albeit for a lower price, even when he was aware of the defect. 
Again this distinction is probably derived from the Medieval Roman law 
distinction between dolus causam dans and dolus incidens – technical vocabulary 
Summenhart explicitly uses in the rest of his treatment. If the buyer had been 
willing to pay a lower price which corresponds to the extent of the defect, 
the seller is obliged to restore the balance. If the buyer, however, would by 
no means have bought the object, he is erring and not consenting to the 
contract. In that case, no matter what happens according to the forum externum, 
in the forum animae the full price must be given back33. Moreover, if the 
seller suspects that the buyer does not know of the defect, it does not matter, 
according to Summenhart, whether the defect is apparent or latent. A defect 
can be apparent, that is recognizable, and yet the seller may have to assume 
that for the specific buyer it is hidden anyway. Hence, defects apparent in 
that way are still to be considered as latent34.
2.2.2. – Extrinsic defects
Although Aquinas was not addressing the question of pre-contractual duties 
to inform about circumstances extrinsic to a contract as such, he made a vital 
contribution to root out such obligations. He does so within the context of 
his discussion of the duty of disclosure of intrinsic defects – which has been 
expounded above. Those who hold that a seller is under no obligation to 
inform about the defects of the merchandise argue, amongst other things, 
that there is a similarity between the non-obligation of the ‘Merchant of 
Rhodes’ to tell about the future abundance in goods, and the non-obligation 
of a seller to disclose his information about latent defects35.
Importantly, Aquinas rejects this analogy established by his opponents 
between the case of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ and the case of intrinsic, latent 
defects in the goods sold. Consequently, he denies that from the non-obligation 
of disclosure in the case of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ one can infer the same 
principle of non-obligation in the case of latent defects. For the first time, 
then, though it is not expressed in the abstract, the distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic qualities of a purchase-sale contract is brought to bear 
upon the question of duties of disclosure36:
33 Conradus Summenhart, Septipertitum opus de contractibus, Augustae Vindelicorum 1515, 
tract. 3, quaest. 54, par. Prima conclusio [without foliation].
34 Summenhart, De contractibus (supra, n. 33), tract. 3, quaest. 54, par. Corollarium primum 
[without foliation].
35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ed. Leonina, supra, n. 29), IIaIIae, quaest. 77, art. 3, 
arg. 4, p. 152: ‘Praeterea, si aliquis teneatur dicere defectum rei venditae, hoc non est nisi ut 
minuatur de pretio. Sed quandoque diminueretur de pretio etiam sine vitio rei venditae, propter 
aliquid aliud, puta si venditor deferens triticum ad locum ubi est carestia frumenti, sciat multos 
posse venire qui deferant; quod si sciretur ab ementibus, minus pretium darent. Huiusmodi 
autem non oportet dicere venditorem, ut videtur. Ergo, pari ratione, nec vitia rei venditae’.
36 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ed. Leonina, supra, n. 29), IIaIIae, quaest. 77, art. 3, 
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A defect in something immediately causes that thing to be priced lower now than 
it seems to be worth. In our case, however, the grain is expected to be priced lower 
in the future because of the arrival – which is unknown to the buyers – of additional 
merchants. Hence, a seller demanding the price which he finds in the market does 
not seem to act against justice if he does not disclose his information about the 
future. Still, if he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it would be exceedingly 
virtuous on his part, although he does not seem to be under an obligation as a 
matter of justice to do so.
Unfortunately, Thomas Aquinas did not elaborate on this short but highly 
influential statement. In any event, his commentators invariably considered 
him to be the chief scholastic authority to have defended the ‘Merchant of 
Rhodes’ ’ non-duty of disclosure. This did not settle the dispute, however.
The authoritative foundations for disagreement were laid in the law faculty, 
in particular, by none less than Bartolus de Saxoferrato. In his commentary 
on D. 19,1,39, which invalidates a seller’s attempt to discharge himself from 
liability for eviction of servitudes attached to the land he sells, he introduces 
a problem that is not wholly identical to Cicero’s ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, but 
still touches upon a similar question: namely insider information. Assume 
that the public authorities will decree to lower the official price of a certain 
commodity, and you as a particular vendor, familiar with the administration, 
know about this future decree through insider information. Are you liable 
for the damage which a buyer incurs because you do not disclose your insider 
information to him? Bartolus definitely thinks you are. A seller is under an 
obligation to share his insider information with the buyer, according to the 
most eminent amongst the commentators, because not so doing amounts to 
fraud (circumventio)37.
In order to support his view, Bartolus refers to the gloss Contra ad D. 1,3,29, 
which assimilates acts that go against the spirit of the law (in fraudem legis) 
to acts that go against the letter of the law (contra legem). Accursius, however, 
did not address the question of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’. In his commentary 
on this famous passage, and by making reference to Guilelmus de Cuneo (ca. 
1270–1335), Bartolus recounts the story of a seller from the leading classes 
ad 4, p. 152–153: ‘Ad quartum dicendum quod vitium rei facit rem in praesenti esse minoris 
valoris quam videatur, sed in casu praemisso, in futurum res expectatur esse minoris valoris per 
superventum negotiatorum, qui ab ementibus ignoratur. Unde venditor qui vendit rem secundum 
pretium quod invenit, non videtur contra iustitiam facere si quod futurum est non exponat. 
Si tamen exponeret, vel de pretio subtraheret, abundantioris esset virtutis, quamvis ad hoc non 
videatur teneri ex iustitiae debito’.
37 Bartolus a Saxoferrato, In secundam Digesti veteris partem, ad D. 19,1,39, Venetiis 1570: 
‘Ordinationem qui sciens factam per superiorem quod aliqua res vendatur minori pretio solito, 
si vendit pro maiori pretio quam fuerit ordinatum, tenetur. (…) Quia videtur facere causa 
circumveniendi eo ipso, quod scit. (…) Vendidit tibi frumentum pro maiori pretio nec certioraverit 
te. Certe videtur teneri ad interesse, et ita glos. sensit in l. Contra legem facit, tit. de legibus’ 
[D. 1,3,29].
102 W. Decock, J. Hallebeek / Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 78 (2010) 89-133
who does not disclose his insider information about the future change in the 
official price of grain as an instance of behaviour that goes against the pro-
hibition to act in contravention of the spirit of the law. Bartolus’s opinion is 
not just ephemeral. One century later, it lives on word for word in the Sin-
gularia of the jurist and merchant Ludovicus Pontanus Romanus (1409–
1439)38.
With the greatest authorities in the law and theology faculties, respectively, 
diverging on the duty to inform about future market conditions, it should 
not come as a surprise that by the end of the 15th century, we find the 
theological tradition split in two.
In his commentary on the Sentences, Biel bases himself on Aquinas and 
simply states that as a matter of justice a merchant is neither under an obligation 
to reduce the price of the thing sold nor under a duty to inform. He motivates 
this conclusion by pointing out the infirm and uncertain character of the 
‘Merchant of Rhodes’ knowledge about the future: all future events are 
contingent and unpredictable39. This is an important argument, preparing 
some of the early modern scholastics’ view of business as an aleatoric game 
in which making profits on the basis of a dominant knowledge position is 
thought to be allowed precisely to the extent that a merchant benefiting from 
a dominant knowledge position actually can turn out to be mistaken.
No less influential, but far more subtle and extended was the discussion of 
the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ in yet another late Medieval theologian from 
Tübingen. In his treatise on contracts, Konrad Summenhart is the first among 
the theologians to take and defend the view that there exists a duty of disclosure, 
or at least a duty to reduce the price. The bottom line of his argument is that 
an imminent future supply of goods already influences the current market 
price in the present, and that a buyer who is not informed does not voluntarily 
consent to the purchase-sale agreement but rather does so on account of 
error40. Moreover, a seller who thinks, or is to be expected to think, that the 
price of his goods will sink in the near future actually knows that the monetary 
value or price of his goods does not correspond any more to its real value. 
Hence, he deceives the buyer either on purpose or on account of crass ignorance. 
In Summenhart’s view, the uncertainty surrounding the imminent abundance 
explains, however, why the seller can still ask 9 if the current price is 10 and 
the future price will be 8.
38 Ludovicus Pontanus Romanus, Singularia, Lugduni 1541, [s.f.], num. 282: ‘Numquid si 
sum magnus mercator et sciam in consilio de ordine dato quod cras minus valebit frumentum. 
Et ego vendidi non notificando emptoribus de ordinatione predicta. Dicendum quod contrahentes 
possunt agere contra me ad interesse suum’.
39 Biel, Collectorium (supra, n. 30), dist. 15, quaest. 10, art. 3, dub. 3, p. 208: ‘Accedit ad idem 
quod future contingentia sunt incerta et multis accidentibus possunt impediri. Ideo talis venditor 
non est certus, utrum supervenient quos putat superventuros.’
40 Summenhart, De contractibus (supra, n. 33), tract. 3, quaest. 62, par. Tertius modus dicendi. 
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All in all, then, Summenhart arrives more or less at the same practical 
conclusions as Aquinas or Biel despite the differences underlying their theo-
retical assessment of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’. It is worthy of mentioning, 
in this respect, that Summenhart spends long hours on developing an inter-
mediary position that contains a lot of ideas on which the early modern 
scholastics would draw. According to this intermediary position, the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’ actually subdivides into three categories.
In the first case, the seller needs to sell at the current market price without 
disclosing his information for the very reason that he cannot avoid proper 
damage without so doing. The buyer, for his part, is either buying for speculative 
reasons, or risks to incur a damage that is no greater in magnitude than the 
damage the seller seeks to avoid. In this event, the seller is under no obligation 
to share his information with the buyer for the simple reason that sound and 
sane charity begins with self-love (ordinata charitas incipit a seipsa)41. The 
second category concerns parties who both have a chance of benefiting from 
that contract even though the current market price is demanded, because the 
seller as well as the buyer are likely to be able to sell these goods in the future 
for the same or a higher price in the same or another place. In this case, the 
‘Merchant of Rhodes’ can legitimately conceal his information because it is 
allowed to prefer his own gain to that of another person (licitum est mihi 
meipsum promovere, proximo neglecto)42. Summenhart cannot approve, not 
even temporarily, of the third case, however. There, a seller is not going to 
incur any damage by disclosing his information, whereas a sale to the current 
market prices always is to the detriment of the buyer. This is a case of unjust 
enrichment, where the profit made by the vendor is directly based on the loss 
that falls on the buyer.
Significantly, in all three of the cases, Summenhart describes the relationship 
between seller and buyer in terms of a competition and contest (certamen). 
This view will reappear in the early modern scholastic tradition.
3. – Early Modern Scholasticism
3.1.– Introductory remarks 
A number of seminal contributions written by legal historians on early 
modern scholasticism have seen the light in recent years43. It is to the credit 
41 Summenhart, De contractibus (supra, n. 33), tract. 3, quaest. 62, par. Secundus modus dicendi.
42 Summenhart, De contractibus (supra, n. 33), tract. 3, quaest. 62, par. Secundus modus dicendi.
43 For references to recent contributions on scholastic legal thought, see W. Decock, Jesuit 
freedom of contract, Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis, 77 (2009), p. 423–458. This article 
also contains a more detailed historical and philosophical contextualization of early modern 
scholastic legal thought. As to the philosophical context of early modern scholastic thought, a 
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of the scholastics of the 16th and 17th centuries to have reached a fruitful 
synthesis of some of the most important intellectual traditions that previously 
prevailed in Europe. These range from Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law 
philosophy, Renaissance humanism, to the late Medieval ius commune. This 
synthesis was then passed on to prominent natural law jurists such as Hugo 
Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694).
The scholastic movement of the 16th and 17th centuries is not of a purely 
theoretical nature, however, in spite of what recent publications often continue 
to suggest. No matter how influential and compelling some of their com-
mentaries on ‘On the laws’ (De legibus), or ‘On justice and law’ (De iustitia 
et iure)44, may prove to be to philosophers of law, early modern scholastic 
treatises are first and foremost the written imprints of very practical and day-
to-day conflict management at a time when the Catholic Church, and its 
theologian-jurists in particular, still had a huge impact on real life decisions. 
If anything, the early modern scholastics acquainted themselves with the 
traditions mentioned above in order to find and forge adequate technical 
devices and tools to deal with the highly practical problems they were faced 
with as consultants to politicians and businessmen. It is well-known that they 
were heavily involved in finding solutions to the real-life questions that posed 
themselves in the wake of the discovery of the Americas. The status of the 
Indians, the relations between various nations, and the regulation of commercial 
activities on a globalized scale are but some of the pressing issues with which 
the Spanish empire was confronted, and the solutions for which they delegated 
to the theology faculty of the University of Salamanca amongst other centres 
of academic excellence on the Iberian peninsula.
The revived scholastic movement in the early modern period is also indicative 
of the Catholic Church’s attempt to maintain its control over increasingly 
independent individuals and states. By giving consultancy to political authorities 
and to the business elite they hoped to consolidate their normative power in 
spite of the opposite tendencies ensuing from the Reformation and political 
absolutism. This search for normative power only increased after the Council 
of Trent. At the turn of the 17th century, we find the Jesuit order continuing 
and reinforcing the scholastic tradition which they inherited from the Domi-
nicans, amongst other religious orders. With Jesuits like Luís de Molina and 
Leonardus Lessius we witness a growing juridification of the moral theological 
fundamental contribution in an equally fundamental volume is M.W.F. Stone, Scrupulosity, 
probabilism, and conscience, The origins of the debate in early modern scholasticism, in: H. Braun 
/ E. Vallance (eds.), Contexts of conscience in early modern Europe, 1500–1700, London 
2004, p. 1–16 and p. 182–188.
44 These various types of literature stem from commentaries on different parts of Thomas 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, notably on IaIIae, q. 90–108 and IIaIIae, q. 57–80, respectively. 
Their autonomization is not only indicative of the growing importance of legal and moral affairs 
for the early modern scholastics, however, but also of the relative autonomy and independence 
of the latter authors with regard to Thomas’s teachings.
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discourse. After all, they conceived of themselves as judges and jurists in what 
is to be understood literally as the court of conscience (forum conscientiae / 
forum internum). Through a meticulous analysis of both reality and legal 
theory, the Jesuits tried to find out which obligations and which rights 
belonged to an individual in very concrete circumstances as a matter of natural 
as well as positive law.
The outcome of a judgment in the court of conscience not only bore upon 
the confessant’s soul, but also on his patrimonial rights and liabilities. Ever 
since Augustine (354–430) had said that no sin could be forgiven unless the 
balance which had been upset between people and their goods was restored, 
restitution had been at the core of the moral theological and canonical debate45. 
Still more symptomatic of the real impact in the external court (forum externum) 
of sentences pronounced in the court of conscience, are the legal remedies 
before the external courts that follow from them46. Against the background 
of the intense interconnectedness between the external and the internal court, 
it should not come as a surprise that the early modern scholastics constantly 
considered the duties to inform both from the perspective of the internal and 
the external court. Eventually, this exercise would even give rise to the birth 
of a new genre of comparative legal literature, namely Differentiae inter 
utrumque forum, iudiciale videlicet et conscientiae, as the Carthusian Juan de 
Valero (1550–1623) entitled his monograph.
3.2. – Intrinsic defects
During the first half of the sixteenth century, the Dominican theologians 
were by far the most famous and prolific members of the early modern 
scholastic movement that tried to re-think the Thomistic heritage in light of 
the emergence of the New World. One of the first Dominicans to lecture in 
Salamanca on the basis of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae was Francisco de 
Vitoria. After expounding the teachings of Aquinas, Vitoria treats of a doctrine 
not yet present in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae nor in the commentary of 
Tommaso de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan, 1469–1534)47, namely that when the 
buyer would not have bought the merchandise at all, had he known of the 
defect, he has entered into the contract involuntarily and, as a consequence, 
the contract is void48. Vitoria explains that this view is based on the teachings 
45 See Augustine, Epistula 153, num. 20 [CSEL 44, III, 419]: ‘Si enim res aliena, propter quam 
peccatum est, cum reddi possit, non redditur, non agitur poenitentia, sed fingitur: si autem 
veraciter agitur, non remittetur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum; sed, ut dixi, cum restitui 
potest’. This text was included by Gratian in C. 14 q. 6 c. 1. 
46 See Joannes de Valero, Differentiae inter utrumque forum, iudiciale videlicet et conscientiae, 
Cartusiae Maioricarum 1616, praeludia [especially num. 4–5, and num. 15–16, p. 1–2].
47 The commentary of Cajetanus on the Summa Theologiae was edited together with the 
textcritical edition of Thomas’s text in the Leonine edition (supra, n. 28). 
48 Franciscus de Vitoria, De Justitia (ed. V. Beltrán de Heredia), vol. 2, Madrid 1934; ad 
IIamIIae, quaest. 77, art. 3, p. 131–145.
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of Aristotle and that it was already defended in the Summa of Sylvester 
Mazzolini da Prierio (1456–1523)49. We have also encountered this idea, 
although less explicitly, in Summenhart’s discussion of intrinsic defects. 
Vitoria himself, however, rejects this view by making reference to Cajetan. 
The involuntary element in the contract does not render it void, provided 
that the seller lowers the price in accordance with the defect, and that the 
defect poses no risks to the buyer. The chief basis for Vitoria’s main argument 
is that a marriage entered into under false presumptions, is nevertheless 
valid. Granted, a contract entered into involuntarily can be inequitable, but 
only when one party is forced into it by the other party. In that case the 
contract is indeed void. Subsequently, Vitoria deals with the question, whether 
it is allowed to keep silent about defects, when selling at a just price, even 
where according to others the contract would be void in view of the fact 
that the buyer would not have bought at all, had he been aware of the 
defects.
There are three different opinions concerning this question. All three can 
be defended with reasonable arguments, but Vitoria himself prefers the third 
opinion. According to the first opinion, it is allowed to keep silent about a 
defect, as long as there exists no danger for the buyer and if the price is just. 
This opinion, which seems to be in conformity with the teachings of Aquinas, 
was rejected by the Scottish philosopher John Mair (Johannes Maior, 1469–
1550) in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Mair considered 
such an act sinful50. Vitoria himself thinks that it is not allowed to deny 
defects when the buyer explicitly asks about their existence. Yet even though 
denying the existence of the defect is a sinful act, he still considers the sale 
contract to be valid. According to the second opinion it is better to inform 
the buyer when one of the features belonging to the natural condition of the 
object to be sold is lacking. A horse, for example, should not be lame. If the 
seller keeps silent about such latent defects, the buyer will be deceived and 
can claim rescission of the contract. If the defects are apparent, however, it 
is the buyer who should watch out. The third opinion consists in a middle 
course between the first two. The seller may keep silent about defects, when 
not explicitly questioned by the buyer. The main argument to support this 
opinion is that third parties (bystanders) do not need to interfere and have 
no duty to take care of the buyer’s interest. They can also keep silent, although 
knowing that the buyer is about to buy something defective. If the seller 
conceals the defect upon explicit questions by the buyer, on the other hand, 
the contract may be rescinded and the buyer can claim damages.
49 Sylvester Prierias, Summa summarum, [Lugduni 1524], s.v. emptio, f. 213rb–213va, num. 20. 
Other writers also refer to Summenhart.
50 Johannes Maior, In quartum sententiarum quaestiones, Parisiis 1516, dist. 15, quaest. 40, 
f. 111v.
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As stated above, this third opinion is the one preferred by Vitoria, albeit 
under the restriction that we are speaking here about defects in the quality, 
not about errors concerning the origin or age of the merchandise. It is striking 
to note that Vitoria emphasizes time and again that it does not pertain to the 
seller’s duty to take care of the buyer’s interest. Rather, he should act in his 
own interest, provided that he acts justly and without sinning. Aquinas had 
already stated that the seller is not obliged to disclose apparent defects. It was 
disputed, however, how this remark should be understood. Vitoria mentions 
the opinion of John Mair, for example, although eventually he does not seem 
to agree with his Scottish master. Following Antipater and criticizing Diogenes 
of Babylon, Mair holds that the seller is obliged to mention the defect, 
whenever it is not noticed by the buyer, irrespective of whether the defect is 
latent or apparent51. We should understand the scholars who state that an 
apparent defect does not have to be mentioned, as if they are referring to the 
situation the buyer had noticed it. In Mair’s view, it is not fair for a seller to 
tell the buyer that the latter has a duty of enquiry (explora diligenter qualis 
sit) rather than he himself having a duty of disclosure. But Vitoria seems to 
disagree with this, and simply goes on to describe still other, legitimate 
interpretations of Aquinas’s remark. One can say that Aquinas was talking 
about positive, human law, when he said that it is not necessary to mention 
an apparent defect, but that in the forum conscientiae the difference between 
latent and apparent defects is irrelevant. Or one can say that the buyer owes 
it to his own negligence (sibi imputetur), if he fails to notice an apparent 
defect.
In his commentary on article 3, the Dominican theologian Domingo de 
Soto treats the question concerning the seller’s duty to disclose defects in the 
quality almost exclusively from the point of view of the forum conscientiae, 
leaving the forum externum explicitly to the jurists52. He first repeats the 
doctrine of Aquinas: the seller may keep silent as long as there is no danger 
and the price is just. Subsequently he states that this rule is in conformity 
with the opinion of the French theologian Jean Gerson (1363–1429)53. It is 
not in line with Summenhart’s opinion, however, because the latter wants 
to increase the requirements for a non-duty of disclosure. Summenhart 
thinks that when the seller knows, or considers it to be likely that the buyer 
would not enter into the sale, if he knew the defects, he is under a duty to 
inform the buyer – an opinion which we have seen echoed in Mair a few 
decades later. Keeping silent in such a case would be unjust. This opinion of 
51 Cf. Maior, In quartum (supra, n. 50) dist. 15, quaest. 40, f. 111v.
52 Dominicus Sotus, De iustitia et iure (with an introduction by V.D. Carro and a Spanish 
translation by M. González Ordóñez), Madrid 1968, lib. 6, quaest. 3, art. 2, p. 553–558.
53 Cf. Regulae Morales, n. 84, in: Jean Gerson, Oeuvres complètes (ed. P. Glorieux), vol. 9, 
Paris 1973, p. 114–115.
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Summenhart’s was also defended by the canonist Abbas Panormitanus54 and 
by Sylvester.
Soto himself returns to the original standpoint of Thomas Aquinas. Like 
Aquinas and Vitoria, Soto rejects the idea that an involuntary consent to the 
sale results in a void contract, at least when the buyer does not run a risk 
because of the defect, and the price is lowered. If Summenhart and his 
supporters are right, contracts would also be void in case of dolus incidens, 
but such an opinion they do not defend. Following Aquinas, Soto maintains 
that there is no duty to inform the buyer about patent defects. The seller may 
keep silent, as may any third party, because whoever exercises his own right 
does not do any injustice to his fellowman. All this seems to be in conformity 
with the ideas of Vitoria, but at this stage Soto introduces what appears to 
be a new and third requirement, in addition to those already mentioned in 
Aquinas (no injury and no risk for the buyer), namely the requirement of 
subjective utility (res sit emptori usui). The seller is only allowed to keep silent, 
when he does not realize that the defect makes the object sold unusable for 
the specific buyer he is contracting with. When selling a lame horse, the seller 
may conceal the defect for an old physician, who is looking for a calm animal, 
but not for a young nobleman who wants to participate in the horse races55. 
In case of patent defects, Soto remarks that there is no need to mention these 
and that the buyer, unless he is blind, may be presumed to enter knowingly 
into the contract. Soto does not seem to take into account the fact that the 
buyer may be inexperienced.
Vitoria and Soto reject the opinion that when the buyer would not have 
bought at all, had he known of the defects, the contract would be void. That 
opinion, which can be found in Panormitanus, Summenhart and Sylvester, 
was based on the distinction between dolus causam dans and dolus incidens, 
as well as on the Aristotelian idea that acts motivated by ignorance are 
involuntary. In the work of Juan de Medina, on the contrary, the legal 
distinction just mentioned appears to play a predominant role56. This is 
striking, since in the case of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, as we will see below, 
Medina also follows Summenhart closely. He writes that in the case of dolus 
dans causam contractui it is not sufficient merely to adapt the selling price in 
accordance with the defects, for the seller, in his capacity as salesman (ex 
54 See Abbas Panormitanus, Commentaria (supra, n. 31), ad X. 3, 19, 4, f. 141rb–va, n. 6. 
What Panormitanus actually says is that the seller has a duty to inform the buyer, if the latter 
is not careful (minus diligens) and is not watching very closely (et non bene prospexit). 
55 This and similar examples can be found in other writers. In Domingo de Báñez (1528–1604) 
the young nobleman is a soldier who wants to go to battle. See Dominicus Báñez, Decisiones 
de iure et iustitia, Venetiis 1595, ad IIamIIae, quaest. 77, art. 3, p. 358. In Luís Lopez († 1596) 
one can sell a blind horse to someone who wants to use the animal for a treadmill. See Ludovicus 
Lopez, Tractatus de contractibus et negotiationibus, Lugduni 1593, lib. 1, cap. 45, p. 277.
56 Joannes de Medina, De poenitentia, restitutione et contractibus, Ingolstadii 1581 (reprint 
Farnborough 1967), tom. 2, quaest. 34, p. 211–214.
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officio), has the duty to inform the buyer. This rule should be observed not 
only when the seller knows for sure that the buyer would not buy if he knew 
of the defects, but also when he merely believes that to be likely. Otherwise, 
there will be culpa on the side of the seller. Just as in the theory of Soto, this 
leads to a third requirement, in addition to Aquinas’ requirements that the 
buyer should not be caused injury nor risk: the seller should disclose the 
defect when he knows or considers it to be likely that the buyer would not 
enter into the contract should he be aware of the defect. Medina thinks it is 
only acceptable to keep silent about the defects, when the seller has no culpa 
in the dolus causam dans contractui of the buyer. According to Medina, his 
opinion does not deviate from those of Aquinas and Gerson, because both 
speak only of situations where there is no such culpa on the side of the seller. 
Subsequently, Medina deals with the situation of dolus incidens, i.e. when 
the buyer, if he knew of the defect, would nevertheless have bought the thing, 
albeit for a lower price. As a matter of fact, if the selling-price does not exceed 
the just price, there may still be dolus incidens, because this just price is not 
the price the buyer is willing to pay. According to Medina, in case of dolus 
incidens the contract is valid and there is no obligation to rescind it, unless 
that would be necessary in order to adjust the price57.
Again, this idea may be prompted by the fact that buyers are familiar with 
the market prices and can perceive a reduced price as a quality indicator. 
Nevertheless it may be sinful not to disclose the defect in such a situation. 
By not disclosing the defects, the seller compels the buyer, against the latter’s 
will, to pay the just price, which is similar to seizing the debtor’s goods in 
view of an unpaid debt. In order to demonstrate this, Medina produces some 
examples. I owe Peter 10 ducats and I am prepared to pay him that money. 
Peter, however, seizes my horse or other things I own worth 10 ducats. Or I 
owe Peter a horse valued at 10 ducats and Peter now takes possession of 10 
of my ducats. Such behaviour certainly involves a sin, albeit not against the 
iustitia commutativa58. It is appropriate to note, however, that Medina indicates 
that all casuistry and rules are likely to have been established in view of 
contracts between professional tradesmen. He remarks that it is safer to deal 
with a wise and experienced party than with simple people (simplices). ‘Safer’ 
(tutior) means that in such professional trading there is a relatively small risk 
that there will be culpa on the side of one of the parties, resulting in a duty 
to make restitution. A similar view can be found in Francisco de Toledo 
(1534–1596), who teaches that a seller is not allowed to keep silent when the 
buyer is inexperienced or blind59.
57 Medina notices that this seems to contradict what Conradus stated in his second conclusion 
of question 54.
58 Later writers, such as Pedro de Aragón presume that Medina is merely talking here about a 
sin against charity.
59 Franciscus Toletus, Summa casuum conscientiae absolutissima sive de instructione sacerdotum, 
Antverpiae 1623, lib. 8, cap. 49, p. 1145, num. 2.
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Medina’s opinion is for the greater part followed by the Augustinian friar 
Pedro de Aragón60. Aragón adopts the third requirement mentioned by 
Medina (no culpa on the part of the seller). He disagrees with Medina, 
however, on the topic of charity and duties to inform. In the footsteps of 
Bartolomeo Fumo († 1555)61, Medina had argued that even though concealing 
defects does not always constitute a sin against justice, it can nevertheless be 
a sin against charity. Typically, however, Pedro de Aragón thinks that even 
concealing qualitative defects is not a sin against charity. Aragón rejects 
Medina’s viewpoint because the latter had based his argument on an entirely 
inapplicable passage from the De officiis of St Ambrose that was quoted by 
Aquinas in the sed contra-argument in the above mentioned quaestio 77, 
article 362. That reference is of no logical value, according to Aragón, since it 
refers only to cases where there is a risk of damage or danger, or in the event 
of dolus causam dans.
In addition, Aragón rejects the applicability of the example of compensation 
figuring in Medina. The one who seizures his debtor’s ducats takes the law 
into his own hands, but does not deceive his fellowman, nor is he secretly 
receiving the latter’s property. Apart from his stimulating discussion with 
Medina, Pedro de Aragón is one of the first to refine the rule that the seller 
is under no obligation to disclose the apparent defects. He does so by applying 
the notion of invincible ignorance (ignorantia invincibilis): ignorance that 
cannot be overcome. The distinction between invincible and non-invincible 
ignorance reaches back at least to Antonio de Córdoba, and it might constitute 
an important legacy of the early modern scholastics to legal thought63. Córdoba 
had defined ignorantia vincibilis as ignorance that can easily be overcome. 
Ignorantia invincibilis, on the other hand, cannot be overcome, however hard 
one tries and takes care (diligentia) in order to know what is unknown64. The 
seller should mention the defects when he notices that the buyer is suffering 
from inexperience (imperitia) or from such invincible ignorance. In the latter 
60 Petrus Aragonensis, In Secundam Secundae D. Thomae commentaria de iustitia et iure, Venetiis 
1595, ad IIamIIae, quaest. 77, art. 3, p. 472–478.
61 See Bartholomaeus Fumus, Summa aurea quae armilla nuncupatur, Antverpiae 1583, s.v. 
emptio, p. 271, num. 16.
62 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (ed. Leonina), IIaIIae, quaest. 77, art. 3, sc.: ‘Sed contra 
est quod Ambrosius dicit, in III de Offic.: In contractibus vitia eorum quae veneunt prodi 
iubentur: ac nisi intimaverit venditor, quamvis in ius emptoris transierint, doli actione vacuantur’.
63 There possibly is a basis for the distinction between surmountable (non-excusable) and 
invincible (excusable) ignorance in Roman law, e.g. in D. 19,2,19,1, and the pair of ideas 
returns in 18th century authors like Augustin Leyser; see Zimmermann, The law of obligations 
(supra, n. 14), p. 367–368, and p. 869–870. It is arguable, however, that the first systematic 
and general application of the distinction between ignorantia invincibilis and ignorantia vincibilis 
stems from the scholastic tradition.
64 See Antonius Cordubensis, Quaestionarium theologicum, Venetiis 1604, lib. 2, quaest. 1, 
p. 3–4.
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case the seller would commit a mortal sin if he were not to mention the defect. 
He would also turn out to be under a duty to make restitution, since he 
unjustly causes his fellowman injury. This clearly indicates that the general 
rules on duties to inform about intrinsic defects were formulated by the early 
modern scholastics against a background of professional merchants entering 
into a purchase-sale contract.
At the end of the sixteenth century, the leading role in the development 
of early modern scholastic legal thought is passed on from the Dominicans 
to the intellectual giants of the newly founded Jesuit order. One of the first 
Jesuits to become influential in moral and legal matters, is Gregorio de 
Valencia (1550–1603), who was born in Medina del Campo but eventually 
went to Dillingen and Ingolstadt as a theology professor. Concerning the 
question whether the seller may keep silent about the defects in the quality 
of the merchandise, he invents a unique and new dogmatic approach by 
introducing the concept of the ‘conditional will’ (velle conditionaliter)65. First 
he deals briefly with the situation in which the latent defect is in all respects 
going to frustrate the buyer’s intention (intentio). In that event the seller is 
under a duty of disclosure. Then Valencia goes on to discuss more extensively 
the case in which the defect is not entirely incompatible with the buyer’s 
intention. Under such circumstances what matters is that the buyer expresses 
his intention, namely that he communicates to the seller which defect he 
personally will not accept. It is this specific defect which matters to that 
particular buyer and which Valencia wants the buyer to express as an explicit 
condition. If he effectively does so, yet the defect in question still turns out 
to be present, the contract is to be rescinded at the request of the buyer 
(secundum voluntatem defraudati). Valencia makes clear that he is talking here 
about an explicit clause in the contract, resulting in merely conditional consent 
to the contract on the part of the buyer. Moreover, he argues that this is the 
situation Sylvester Prierias, Juan de Medina and Martín de Azpilcueta (1492–
1586)66 had in mind when saying that in case of dolus causam dans contractui 
the sale is void. In Valencia’s view, they had all envisaged conditional contracts, 
while our Jesuit interpreted Soto to have been talking about an unconditional 
sale when he pretended the sale based on dolus causam dans still to be valid. 
The reason why only an explicit condition concerning a specific defect can 
render the contract void when the defect is present, despite the buyer’s 
expressly conditional consent, is supported through a simple, and pragmatic 
argument. Valencia holds that otherwise all contracts would be void. Hardly 
ever do we find a seller disclosing all defects. Very often, however, we do find 
a buyer who is somewhat disappointed upon receiving the merchandise. Yet 
65 See Gregorius de Valencia, Commentarii theologici, Ingolstadii 1595, tom. 3, disp. 5, quaest. 
20, punct. 4, cols. 1513–1525.
66 See Martinus Azpilcueta (Dr. Navarrus), Enchiridion sive manuale confessariorum et poenitentium, 
Wirceburgi 1593, cap. 23, p. 672, num. 89.
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if this were to be sufficient reason to render a contract void, hardly any sales 
contract would remain safe from invalidity and unenforceability.
In sum, Valencia seems to add new requirements to Aquinas’ rule that the 
seller may keep silent about the (latent) defects as long as they do not cause 
injury or danger. In Valencia’s view, Aquinas’ rule holds good unless the 
defects absolutely clash with the buyer’s intention, or unless the buyer has 
consented to the contract under the express condition that a certain defect 
is absent. As regards patent defects, Valencia states that if the buyer does not 
notice the defect out of carelessness (incuria) – which amounts to non-
invincible ignorance – what matters is whether the defect clashes with the 
buyer’s intention, or whether it is incompatible with the explicit condition 
to his consent. Non-invincible ignorance does not grant the seller a right to 
compel performance from the buyer against his will. Hence, the words of 
Aquinas that patent defects do not have to be mentioned, should be interpreted 
as applying solely to cases where the seller clearly knows that the buyer had 
noticed the defect, but nevertheless wanted to buy.
Valencia’s opinion did not become standard doctrine amongst the Jesuits. 
This may be due in no small part to Luís de Molina’s contribution on duties 
to inform about intrinsic defects. A professor of philosophy at Coïmbra, who 
went on to teach theology at the University of Evora, Molina, more than 
anyone before him, discusses the civil law at great lengths67. It is within the 
context of his treatment of positive law, in particular, that Molina rejects the 
opinion that, when, according to the ius commune or Castilian law, an actio 
redhibitoria is granted, the contract is still valid in the forum externum. This 
opinion was derived from the argument that, if the contract was null and 
void, there would be no need to rescind it, and since a remedy was granted 
for this purpose, the contract was obviously valid. Molina, however, explains 
that this way of reasoning, which he ascribes to Summenhart, is not valid, 
because the actio redhibitoria can be used for other purposes and can also be 
used when the contract is already void. As the gloss Et eleganter ad D. 4,3,7pr. 
explains, the actio redhibitoria does not always serve to rescind an invalid 
contract, but also to restore the previous situation, thereby annulling the 
performances.
Valencia’s criticism of the rule that even without an explicit condition 
concerning a specific defect the contract can be void when the defect is present, 
was endorsed by the Portuguese Jesuit Estevão Fagundez (1577–1645)68 and 
by Fernando de Castropalao (1583–1633)69. They agreed that, if this were 
67 The civil law is at the centre of attention in Ludovicus Molina, De iustitia et iure, tom. 2, 
Conchae 1597, disp. 353, cols. 598–615.
68 Stephanus Fagundez, De iustitia et contractibus et de acquisitione et translatione dominii, 
Lugduni 1641, lib. 5, cap. 38, p. 483.
69 Ferdinandus de Castropalao, Opus morale de virtutibus et vitiis contrariis, Lugduni 1700, 
part. 7, tract. 33, disp. 5, punct. 22, p. 366, num. 4.
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to be followed, hardly any contract of sale would be valid and all social and 
commercial life would be disrupted. As Vitoria already said ‘no mule is born 
without a spot’ (no nace mula sin tacha). Molina also must have appreciated 
this undesirable effect, but the solution he offers is entirely different to 
Valencia’s theory of conditional consent. Molina returns in the footsteps of 
Soto. With Soto he rejects the idea that dolus dans causam contractui makes 
the contract involuntary and thus void for the simple reason that this should 
also be said for cases of dolus incidens. If the buyer would not have bought 
had he known of the defect, it was reasoned that his consent is involuntary 
and his ignorance makes the contract void. But whoever accepts this, should 
also accept that, if the buyer would have bought the thing but not for the 
present price, his consent is similarly involuntary and his ignorance would 
likewise make the contract void. The latter view, however, was never defended 
by the scholars Soto and Molina were challenging.
Moreover, Molina also adopts a utility requirement, albeit an objective 
one, and not a subjective one as was the case with Soto. This is Molina’s first 
important contribution to the discussion on duties to inform about intrinsic 
defects. A second innovation is that Molina considers only major defects to 
be relevant, thereby referring to Roman law (D. 21,1,1,8 and D. 21,1,4) and 
to the gloss Mala enfermedad ad Siete Partidas 5,5,65. So we can say that as 
a principal rule in Molina’s doctrine the seller is allowed to conceal the defects, 
if they do not cause injury or risk (Aquinas), and as long as they do not lead 
to a considerably reduced utility for the purpose for which the merchandise 
is usually sold. This criterion was to become influential, not only in Early 
Modern scholasticism, but also in the schools of natural law in the North of 
Europe. As a consequence, whether we sell the lame horse to an old physician 
or to a young nobleman is of no relevance. In Molina and his followers we 
find plenty of examples making clear which defects do, and which defects do 
not make a certain thing considerably less useful from an objective point of 
view. For instance, the one who sells a slave who is not inclined to run away 
and has no serious diseases, is not obliged to tell the buyer that the slave is 
one who takes it easy or likes to drink wine70. For that slave is not particularly 
useless according to objective standards of usefulness. Similarly, a cobbler is 
not obliged to tell the buyer that the shoes he made are not made out of the 
best quality leather. This is different when the defect makes the merchandise 
considerably less useful from an objective point of view. In such a case the 
seller should not only adapt the price, but also tell the buyer why he did so. 
Examples of defects which make the merchandise considerably less useful in 
an objective sense are salted meat and fish which are sold on the market as 
70 According to other writers, addiction to drink is a quality which does make the slave 
considerably less usable. See Castropalao, Opus morale (supra, n. 69), tract. 33, disp. 5, punct. 
22, p. 366, num. 8.
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though they were fresh and without preservatives, because, generally speaking, 
a buyer wants that kind of food for immediate consumption71.
As regards patent defects, according to Molina there is no remedy available 
in the forum externum, unless an action is based on laesio enormis. In the 
forum conscientiae no remedy lies at all as long as the sale is equitable, and 
except for cases where at the moment of entering into the contract, it was 
absolutely clear to the seller that the buyer did not realize that there was a 
considerable, albeit patent, defect in the merchandise. If the defect renders 
the object considerably less useful for its (objective) purpose, the seller is 
under a duty of conscience to warn the buyer.
The criterion that the (objective) utility of the merchandise should not be 
considerably reduced by the defects, appears to have become the prevailing 
idea. We find it in the writings of many other Jesuits, for example Leonardus 
Lessius, a Jesuit born near Antwerp – then the major port and metropolis of 
northern Europe – who taught moral theology at the Jesuit College in Louvain, 
and is well-known for his in-depth knowledge and familiarity with contem-
porary business practice72. Referring himself to the usual practices and customs 
in trade relationships (consuetudo mercatorum), Lessius too states that the 
mere fact that the buyer would not have bought the goods, had he been aware 
of the defect, does not make the sale void in an absolute sense and does not 
result in an obligation to make restitution. A seller is allowed to conceal the 
defects in his merchandise – provided, of course, that the buyer is not likely 
to run the risk of incurring damage or danger, and that the defects do not 
make the object considerably less useful for the purpose required (ad usum 
cui expetitur). Whether the latter points in the direction of a subjective or an 
objective utility requirement, however, is not entirely clear. Moreover, when 
the buyer examines the merchandise and is going by his own judgement and 
does not ask anything except the price, the seller’s only obligation is to see 
that the selling price is just. He has no obligation to disclose latent defects. 
It even suffices to show the buyer the risk of danger after the sale is concluded. 
If the buyer’s expectations are frustrated subsequent to such a deal, he only 
71 See Joannes de Lugo, Disputationes de iustitia et iure, Lugduni 1646, tom. 2, disp. 26, sect. 
8, p. 334, num. 134; Antonius Escobar y Mendoza (1589–1669), Theologia moralis, Lugduni 
1659, tract. 3, exam. 6, cap. 3, p. 400–401, num. 30, and cap. 5, p. 407, num. 69; and 
Ferdinandus de Castropalao, Opus morale (supra, n. 69), tract. 33, disp. 5, punct. 22, p. 367, 
num. 12.
72 Leonardus Lessius, De iustitia et iure, Antverpiae 1621, lib. 2, cap. 21, dub. 11, p. 284–286. 
In a student’s notes of Lessius’s lectures De iustitia et iure copied by Philippus Rovenius, whose 
manuscript is preserved in the Utrecht University Library (Hs 6 G 7), the question of intrinsic 
defects is dealt with in cap. 10, dub. 4, f. 92r–93r. There is some controversy about the authorship 
of the manuscript, cf. T. Van Houdt, Leonardus Lessius over lening, intrest en woeker, ‘De iustitia 
et iure’, lib. 2, cap. 20, editie, vertaling en commentaar, [Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke 
Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren, en Schone Kunsten van België, 162], Brussel 
1998, p. XV.
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has to blame himself for not having asked the seller’s advice (si deceptus est, 
sibi imputet).
Lessius realizes that such a rule might be at variance with the Roman law 
provisions of D. 19,1,13 and D. 21,1,1 which grant a remedy for rescission 
if the seller did not disclose the defects. But he does not consider that to be 
a problem. For one thing, the Roman rule is merely derived from positive 
law. It is only in force where it is received by custom, for another. The Roman 
rules could also be interpreted as applying to cases where the buyer had 
expressly asked the seller to disclose the defects, or in the sense that rescission 
is only granted by judicial decree. According to natural law, then, which is 
the ultimate criterion in the court of conscience, a seller is under no obligation 
to disclose latent defects unless the buyer expressly asks him to do so73. The 
seller who does not inform a buyer relying on his own judgement, may act 
against the virtue of charity, however, when he sees that the buyer is erring 
because of his simplicity (simplicitas), and not merely because of lack of 
prudence and diligence (levitas). In this respect, even the criterion of objective 
utility needs some modification, in the sense that a seller needs to inform a 
buyer suffering from simplicity when he knows that the object will be useless 
for this poor man’s specific purposes, although the object might still be useful 
to others despite its defects.
The Jesuit Juan de Lugo seems to have followed into the footsteps of Lessius, 
by introducing the distinction whether or not the buyer indicates to the seller 
for which purpose he wants to buy74. No doubt this is merely a more explicit 
account of the dichotomy present in Lessius. If a buyer does not indicate his 
subjective purpose regarding the thing sold, the seller is allowed to conceal 
the defects when they do not make the merchandise considerably less useful 
for the purpose for which the object is normally sold. If this is not the case, 
however, the seller is tacitly deceiving the buyer and merely adjusting the 
price to the defective quality will not be sufficient. If the defect in itself is 
patent, there is no need to mention it, unless the specific buyer is so blind or 
ignorant (rudis), that he does not see what is visible to others. In such a case, 
the patent defect must be presumed to be latent. According to Fernando de 
Castropalao the seller should disclose patent defects, whenever it is clear that 
the buyer is not capable of recognizing these because of his lack of expertise 
or his rustic simplicity (rusticitas). However, the latter should not be too 
readily presumed, because even country dwellers and peasants are careful to 
inspect the things they buy. In the court of conscience, however, it is better 
to disclose even the patent defects as if they were entirely latent in such a 
73 Leonardus Lessius, De iustitia (supra, n. 72), lib. 2, cap. 17, dub. 5, p. 201, num. 33 (in 
fine).
74 Joannes de Lugo, De iustitia (supra, n. 71), disp. 26, sect. 8, p. 332–338. 
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case, because from the position of the buyer (comparatione emptoris) they 
actually are latent75.
3.3. – Extrinsic defects
Known for his vital role in the renaissance of Thomism at the University 
of Salamanca, it should not come as a surprise that we find Francisco de 
Vitoria follow the view of Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the Secunda 
Secundae76. Yet at the same time he strengthened the arguments underlying 
it, contrary to Cajetan, who had failed to elaborate on the ‘Merchant of 
Rhodes’ in his own commentary on Aquinas77.
Vitoria distinguishes between a merchant’s simply keeping silent (tacere) 
about future market conditions, and his making positive statements about 
the future that are not in line with his own information (decipere). Only the 
latter act is formally speaking a positive act of deceit from bad faith (deceptio 
positiva mala fide) and therefore a sin that obliges the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ 
to make restitution. Keeping silent, on the other hand, is not considered a 
sin by Vitoria at all. For a businessman is not expected to put his own interests 
at risk (agere rem suam) by behaving ‘like a teacher’. The ultimate criterion 
then is the current market price, determined by public information. Vitoria 
points out the absurdities that would ensue from taking into account private 
information as a price determining factor. Under that assumption, a business-
man with more information about the future would be worse off than a 
businessman who had less information, since the latter could still demand 
the current market price.
Conversely, Vitoria also approves of buyers who make a deal at the current 
price in spite of their knowledge about future scarcity. To support his view, 
he refers to the anecdote about Thales the Milesian, told by Aristotle in his 
Politics78. Eager to show that philosophers can easily get rich if they like, even 
though their ambition is of another sort, Thales hired all the olive-presses in 
winter because he knew by virtue of his astronomical predictions that there 
would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year. In summer, naturally, 
he made a substantive profit. An excellent story, showing that speculative 
activities based on a dominant knowledge position were approved. What is 
more, he thought speculation to be an essential part of commerce and business 
acumen (est ars mea quod scio esse sic futurum), which everybody has a right 
75 Ferdinandus de Castropalao, Opus morale (supra, n. 69), part. 7, tract. 33, disp. 5, punct. 22, 
p. 366, num. 7.
76 See Francisco de Vitoria, In IIamIIae (ed. B. de Heredía, supra, n. 48), quaest. 77, art. 3, 
ad 4, p. 144, num. 16.
77 Cajetanus, In IIamIIae (ed. Leonina, supra, n. 28), quaest. 77, art. 3, ad 4, p. 153.
78 Aristoteles, Politica, 1, 11, 1259a5–1259a23. We consulted the following edition: Aristotelis 
Politica, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W.D. Ross, [Scriptorum classicorum 
bibliotheca Oxoniensis], Oxonii 19735 [= 1957], p. 20–21.
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to practise, provided blatant fraud and deceit are absent. Therefore, Vitoria 
could not argue that the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ had a duty of disclosure about 
extrinsic ‘defects’.
In his De iustitia et iure, Domingo de Soto continued the Dominican view 
bequeathed to him by his master Vitoria. He simply held that a merchant is 
under no obligation to disclose his information about future market con-
ditions79. His somewhat dull and short discussion of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, 
which repeats Aquinas’ argument, and merely contains references to the story 
of Joseph in Genesis and Aristotle’s account in the Politics of Thales the 
Milesian’s speculative activities, stands in marked contrast to the vivacity of 
the debate as it appears in one of Vitoria’s teachers at the University of Paris. 
During his stay there from 1508 till 1522, Vitoria not only got involved in 
the renaissance of Thomism. Next to his contacts with Pieter Crockaert (ca. 
1450–1514), the Dominican friar from Brussels who had reintroduced Aquinas’ 
Summa theologiae as a textbook at the theology faculty of Paris, Vitoria also 
studied with one of the foremost nominalist thinkers of the time, the Scotsman 
John Mair. In point of fact, there is no doubt that Vitoria drew heavily on 
the latter’s intense and compelling discussion of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’80.
John Mair restructures the case in terms of a grain merchant from Normandy 
who arrives in London at a time of great dearth – knowing that other ships 
are on their way – or in terms of a wine merchant from Burgundy who wants 
to speculate on higher prices in the Paris region. What is more, John Mair 
fully recognizes a merchant’s right to demand the current market price without 
telling anything about the future market conditions. This, however, only 
holds true within the boundaries of the professional market. Anticipating an 
important qualification to the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, later to be adopted in 
no small a degree by the Jesuits, Mair expressly holds that when confronted 
with a simple and non-professional buyer (simplex forum ignorans), the merchant 
has a duty of disclosure. Still, in the wake of Konrad Summenhart, whom he 
explicitly quotes, Mair thinks of the relationship between professional market 
participants as a contest (certamen).
Interestingly, Mair approves of the three cases which Summenhart had 
carefully put forward but rejected in expounding the intermediary position. 
He declares that no matter whether the seller needs to sell at the current 
market price in order to be able to make profits or merely to avoid his own 
damage, the damage the buyer incurs on account of this never constitutes a 
form of unjust enrichment. If the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ does not disclose his 
information in order to avoid his own damage, he is not liable for the buyer’s 
damage, because it is allowed for him to prefer the avoidance of his own 
detriment (potius se servabit indemnem quam alios). He can even pursue a 
clearly profitable bargain that is to the detriment of the buyer, because a 
79 Sotus, De iustitia et iure (supra, n. 52), lib. 6, quaest. 3, par. Ad tertium, p. 557–558.
80 Cf. Johannes Maior, In quartum (supra, n. 50), dist. 15, quaest. 41, f. 113v–114r.
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merchant has a right to capitalize on an opportunity that is present and certain 
rather than to wait for a likely, but nevertheless uncertain chance to make 
money in the future. To fail to do so would be a testimony to the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’’ lack of economic prudence (essem imprudens relinquere mihi 
lucrum praesens). Mair also defends this view on the grounds that the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’ has a duty to look after the well-being not only of himself but of 
his entire family (oportet me mihi et familiae meae providere). Therefore he 
cannot afford to let slip an opportunity to make money on the basis of his 
dominant knowledge position.
Domingo de Soto’s relatively tedious discussion is all the more perplexing 
given that only a few years before he wrote his treatise, the whole debate 
about the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ had been reinvigorated and turned topsy-
turvy by Juan de Medina.
Unrestrained by fidelity to the official line taken by a religious order, say 
the Dominicans, Medina answers the question of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ 
in the negative81. A merchant is not allowed to sell at the current price when 
he knows that the price is going to fall in the near future. Since he knows 
that the common estimation of the current price stems from false assumptions 
and a lack of information (ex errore seu ignorantia), he cannot in good faith 
decide to demand a price based on it. Like Summenhart, Medina thinks that 
the current price is not the just price but merely a fictitious price (pretium 
putatum) that does not correspond to its real value. In addition, he repeats 
Summenhart’s claim that a not too distant arrival of a large supply of a 
commodity has the same price-lowering effect on the common estimation as 
if it were effectively present. Buyers consenting to the high current price are 
only doing so from a lack of knowledge, i.e. they are not consenting voluntarily 
(non libere consentiunt in pretii quantitate). According to Medina, a seller is 
obliged to inform the buyer of his personal knowledge of future changes in 
both the intrinsic and extrinsic qualities of a commodity. Otherwise he 
commits a sin against charity, particularly if the buyer enters into the agreement 
with a view of stock-piling (ad servandum eas) rather than consuming imme-
diately.
Medina maintains that for a contract to be allowed, not only should there 
be a fair ratio of money to commodities, guaranteed by the just price, but 
also a balanced relation between buyer and seller: their conditions should be 
equal (debet ipsorum contrahentium conditio aequalis esse) – and he clearly 
thought that the level of information was part of that personal condition. 
Like the Stoic philosopher Antipater, he infers this from the distinctly social 
function of contracts which should be of use to the common good of all 
market participants (pro communi contrahentium utilitate sint institutae). 
Hence, the question whether an individual seller sells in good faith or in bad 
faith is of singular interest, with Medina considering the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ 
81 Cf. Johannes de Medina, De poenitentia (supra, n. 56), tom. 2, quaest. 35, p. 214–217.
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to be guilty of deceit. Nevertheless, he concludes, with Summenhart, that 
the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is not obliged to demand the fully decreased future 
price. It suffices for him to lower the price just a little bit in accordance with 
his knowledge, or to disclose his information to the buyer.
From this conclusion Medina derives the solution to four cases he evoked 
in the course of his discussion, and which will remain a constant point of 
reference in the subsequent treatments of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’: (1) A 
merchant who knows that a city in which his goods are stocked is going to 
be besieged, is not allowed to sell his stock promptly at the current market 
price; (2) A landlord knowing that the royal court is going to move away 
from the region where he holds his estate, can no longer rent his house to an 
ignorant tenant at the current price; (3) Someone who has insider information 
about a future statute or decree that will lower the price of grain, is not allowed 
to sell his stocks at the current price; (4) Someone having insider information 
about a future devaluation cannot change his money at the current exchange 
rate. It is worth noting that, certainly in the third case, Medina could have 
supported his solution by making a reference to Bartolus de Saxoferrato, but 
this he did not do.
A fundamental contribution to the question of good faith and deceit to 
which Medina had paid so much importance is to be found in the Relectio 
in regulam Peccatum of the canonist Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva. Covarruvias 
introduces what he calls the beautiful question (pulchra dubitatio) of speculation, 
and the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ in particular, into the debate about deceit in 
card playing agreements82. Significantly as we shall see below, the Jesuit 
Leonardus Lessius transferred Covarruvias’s image of the card playing contract 
into the case of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’.
What makes Covarruvias’ contribution so compelling is his notion that 
fraud and deceit can only be measured when compared with what he literally 
calls the laws of the game (leges ludi). He holds, indeed, that every game is 
ruled by its own natural laws on which all parties entering into such a game 
tacitly agree. All measures of prudent deceit and precaution (dolus et cautelae) 
that are in accordance with the laws of the game cannot give rise to a com-
plaint. In case of doubt as to whether the limits to these acts of prudence and 
carefully applied deceit have been transgressed, the advice of experienced and 
knowledgeable men (iudicium peritorum) is the ultimate criterion of judge-
ment. Under reference to the distinction in D. 4,3,1,3 between bad deceit 
(dolus malus) and good deceit (dolus bonus) – good deceit being synonymous 
with skill (sollertia) – Covarruvias explicitly conceives of dolus bonus as an 
essential part of the natural laws of a gaming contract. He again affirms, by 
inserting rather dubious references to the Ordinary Gloss to D. 19,5,5,2, 
82 Cf. Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva, In regulam Peccatum, de regulis iuris, lib. 6, Relectio, part. 
2, par. 4, in: Opera omnia, Augustae Taurinorum 1594, tom. 2, p. 486–488.
120 W. Decock, J. Hallebeek / Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 78 (2010) 89-133
D. 19,5,17,2, D. 45,1,85 and D. 50,17,161, that it is always allowed to avail 
yourself of the laws of the game.
Subsequently, Covarruvias addresses the question whether it is allowed for 
a card player to raise stakes on seeing that he has a good hand. Some say it 
is not. In this respect, he quotes Bartolus de Saxoferrato’s and Ludovicus 
Pontanus Romanus’ condemnation of a seller who avails himself of his insider 
information to make profits. In addition, he quotes Conradus’ and Medina’s 
appeal to the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ to disclose his information about future 
market circumstances. But then he goes on to make the case for the opposite 
view. A card player is not obliged to share his information with the other 
parties to the contract, on account of a natural law of gaming (ob naturalem 
ludi legem) which implies that somebody who has a good hand is allowed to 
take advantage by raising his stakes. Conversely, a player who finds himself 
with a bad hand, has a right to try and deceive his challenger by bluffing and 
raising the stakes. Covarruvias quotes the commentator Philippus Decius 
(1464–1536)83, and Juan de Medina in support of his view. Medina had 
argued, indeed, that card players implicitly agree to the law of gaming contracts, 
namely that a player who has a fortunate hand can raise his stakes84.
As Covarruvias points out, a parallel between the case of card playing and 
the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is actually difficult to establish, because the nature 
of the purchase-sale contract is different from a game. Hence Bartolus’ objection 
is irrelevant. What is more, by referring to Aquinas, Covarruvias holds that 
Bartolus’ assessment of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is entirely false. He asserts 
that, with the exception of a civil servant, a seller who enjoys a dominant 
knowledge position does not have a duty of disclosure, although he would 
clearly prove to be richer in virtue, if he shared his information.
In the subtitle to his Quaestionarium theologicum, Antonio de Córdoba 
explicitly mentions his aim to solve cases of conscience on the basis of both 
the legal and the theological tradition. Córdoba is one of the rare theologians, 
indeed, who mentions the commentators Bartolus de Saxoferrato and Ludo-
vicus Pontanus Romanus as proponents of Summenhart’s and Medina’s 
unconventional position within the scholastic tradition. Córdoba intends to 
reconcile the two separate traditions which had developed in addressing the 
position of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’. One of the few Franciscan friars who 
played a fundamental and influential role in moral theological and legal 
debates in the early modern period, he thus produced an extensive account 
of both positions before the final re-working of the case by the Jesuits took 
place at the turn of the 17th century.
83 Decius actually approved of a betting contract in favour of a certain Silvester in which 
another person promised him to give a certain amount of money if condition x, which Silvester 
knew with certainty to happen, would be fulfilled; cf. Responsa sive consilia, Francoforti ad 
Moenum 1588, cons. 115.
84 Johannes de Medina, De poenitentia (supra, n. 56), tom. 2, quaest. 22, p. 151.
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Although Córdoba proposes a third way in order to mediate between the 
two positions, one might wonder if it represents anything more than an 
attempt of a pupil to pay respect to his reverend master Juan de Medina85. 
His third way consists of a distinction between cases where an ordinary market 
price exists already, and cases were such a price is lacking. In the former the 
opinion of Aquinas and his followers should be followed, whereas Medina is 
to be taken as a guide in the event that no established market price or official 
price, determined by the public authorities, exists. A somewhat theoretical 
distinction, one might say. It certainly is, if one considers that Córdoba 
actually brings the argument of the Thomistic tradition to perfection, while 
refuting Medina’s standpoint indirectly in representing it as a possible objection 
to the Thomistic point of view.
Córdoba holds that Medina’s concern about good faith and the absence 
of deceit is not actually incompatible with the Thomistic argument. In ex plain-
ing why, he expressly points out the crucial distinction between circumstances 
that are extrinsically or intrinsically relevant to the formation of a just price. 
According to Córdoba, Medina is right in looking to good faith, but only to 
the extent that the knowledge of a particular party to the contract concerns 
circumstances that intrinsically contribute to the establish ment of a just price 
(cognitio et ignorantia conditionum intrinsece et per se facientium ad iustitiam 
pretii rerum constituendam)86. An example of such a circumstance is a defect 
in the thing sold as to its natural value, substance, quality or quantity. The 
Thomists are right, however, in not having regard for this so-called good faith 
in conditions where the knowledge of it is definitely to be considered extrinsic 
and accidental for establishing a just price (cognitio et ignorantia conditionum 
extrinsece et per accidens facientis ad iustum pretium constituendum). Examples 
of such circumstances are future market conditions such as abundance and 
scarcity. Hence, Córdoba does not believe the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ to be 
under a duty to disclose his information. Neither does he believe that anyone 
in the four cases addressed by Medina is bound to do so, though he hesitates 
in case of the landlord.
The contrived and purely theoretical nature of Córdoba’s intermediary 
position is highlighted by the Augustinian Pedro de Aragón in his De iustitia 
et iure87. For if the just price is not yet determined by common estimation 
or the public authorities, in practice this will mean that the object of sale is 
85 In his Quaestionarium (supra, n. 64), lib. 1, quaest. 14, par. Opinio prima, p. 135, he calls 
him ‘clarissimus doctor Medina magister meus’. Compare A. Lamela, Aportación bio-bibliográfica 
en torno a Fray Antonio de Córdoba, O.F.M. (1485–1578), Liceo francescano, 6 (1953), p. 179–
208.
86 Antonius Cordubensis (Antonio de Córdoba), Quaestionarium (supra, n. 65), lib. 1, quaest. 14, 
p. 136.
87 Petrus Aragonensis, In secundam secundae (supra, n. 60), ad quaest. 77, art. 2 et 3, p. 635–
637.
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a luxury. But the price of such goods is established individually by agreement 
between the seller and the buyer (ex contrahentium conventione), and the seller 
can try and get the best bargain he can for such goods, even by keeping silent 
about their future abundance in the market.
With Aragón, the general theory of just pricing becomes increasingly 
involved in the process of finding the right solution to the ‘Merchant of 
Rhodes’. Aragón is eager to both underpin the Thomistic point of view and 
to rebuke Medina by referring to the theory of just pricing. A seller can sell 
at the current market price without disclosing any information about the 
future, since the true and just value of things is not determined by the estimation 
of one single person (iustus et verus valor rerum non ex privata unius vel duorum 
pendet aestimatione), but by common estimation of the price. In turn the 
common estimation or the official price are not dependent on the knowledge 
or ignorance of an individual, but on the knowledge of the community. 
Aristotle himself had pointed out in the fifth book of the Nichomachean 
Ethics, as Aragón rightly affirms, that justice complies with objective and not 
with subjective criteria (est iustitia a parte rei).
Against Medina, Aragón repeats Córdoba’s distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic circumstances which determine the just price, and he repeats 
the thesis that the just price is dependent solely on the common, public 
knowledge or ignorance (per solam communem cognitionem vel ignorantiam). 
Furthermore, Aragón holds that the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is allowed not 
only to keep silent about what he knows (tacere), but even to make false 
statements and to lie (mentiri) if the buyer asks him about his knowledge. 
He argues that this is just a white lie (mendacium officiosum), which a seller 
has a right to use in order to avoid a significant loss himself. The consequent 
damage incurred by the buyer is merely an accidental consequence (per accidens 
damnificetur) of the seller’s right to protect his own resources. Thus regarded 
as a matter of the virtue of justice, which merely looks at the balance between 
rights and obligations, nothing is wrong, with this purchase-sale contract. 
Aragón draws a parallel here with two beggars that are equally poor: both of 
them have a right to lie to one another with regard to the presence of an 
almsgiver, because they are equally entitled to obtain those alms (uterque 
pauper habet idem ius).
Yet by insisting on looking at the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ from the perspective 
of justice, Aragón at the same time triggers the question as to how the case 
of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is to be assessed, then, in terms of the greater 
virtue of charity. Here again, his reasoning is astonishingly liberal. Reminiscent 
of Summenhart and Mair is his claim that sound and sane charity takes its 
origins in self-love (charitas bene ordinata a seipso incipiat). Hence, a merchant 
only has a duty to take care of his neighbour if that is not to his own detriment. 
For example, if the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ does not expect himself to be 
particularly worse off without making the deal at the current price, while the 
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buyer would suffer very serious damage, he has a duty either to disclose his 
knowledge about the future to that buyer, or to look for two or more buyers 
in order to make more deals of a minor importance (divisim) instead of selling 
his whole supply to this one buyer who is going to be ruined. If, however, 
not concealing his own information, or not making expressly false statements 
about his true knowledge would be to his own, grave detriment, Aragón 
concludes that, even as a matter of charity, it is not wrong for the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’ to refrain from disclosing the right information from the other 
party to the contract.
To sum up, through emphasizing the theory of just pricing, in opening 
the discussion about lying, and by defending the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ even 
as a matter of charity, Aragón anticipates the discussion by the Jesuits Luís 
de Molina, Leonardus Lessius, and Juan de Lugo.
The Jesuit tradition is not as uniform as a quick glance at the ‘big three’ 
just mentioned might lead one to suspect. This has already appeared above 
as regards the duty to disclose intrinsic defects. In his Commentarii theologici 
Gregorio de Valencia – whose thought seems as sophisticated in legal affairs 
as that of his pupil Suárez in matters metaphysical – develops a unique 
argument88. To be sure, he took sides with the Thomistic tradition, and 
produced a convincing rebuttal of Medina’s views, yet at the same time his 
resolution of the cases put forward by Medina was more in line with its 
original author’s spirit than that of mainstream early modern scholastic 
thought.
On a theoretical level, Valencia succeeded in proving the absurdity of 
Medina’s insistence on applying the bona fides requirement to the knowledge 
of future market circumstances. A standard argumentum ex absurdo against 
Medina’s position, reaching back at least to Córdoba, had been that if a seller 
with knowledge of a future fall in prices who had not disclosed his information 
or reduced the contractual price was under an obligation to make restitution, 
then a seller who had not known about the future decrease in the price level 
at all would also be held liable to make restitution of the difference between 
the current market price and the future market price. For the just price 
imposed itself upon everybody invariably.
Now Valencia tries to imagine how Medina could have replied to this 
critique. He could have said that the buyers would not have been particularly 
irritated by the latter seller, and accordingly would have considered their own 
consent to his offer voluntary. In addition, in Medina’s analysis, this seller’s 
good faith would have discharged him from the obligation to make restitution 
(bona fides illum ab obligatione restituendi liberaret). Yet this is nonsense, says 
Valencia, since the requirement of justice in economic exchange depends on 
88 See Gregorius de Valencia, Commentarii (supra, n. 65), tom. 3, disp. 5, quaest. 20, punct. 
4, p. 1462–1465.
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the balance between price and object regardless of the intentions and attitudes 
of the persons involved. Put in a more legal terminology, the obligations 
ensuing from justice follow the object (obligatio sequitur rem). If the future 
price were already the just price, then that would affect all transactions 
involving the current, high market price, even of sellers acting in ‘good faith’. 
Logically speaking, every seller charging the current price should be under 
an obligation to make restitution on account of the fact that he holds a surplus 
with regard to the just proportion between the object and its new (decreased) 
price. But this is an absurd conclusion, accordingly proving the absurdity of 
Medina’s point of departure.
Nevertheless, Gregorio de Valencia proves himself to be not wholly insensitive 
to Medina’s fallible logic in addressing the cases assimilated to the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’. By way of example, take the case of the merchant who is eager 
to sell his stocks at the current price because he knows about the coming 
siege of the city where his commercial activities are centred. Here Valencia 
applies Medina’s distinction between a buyer entering into the contract in 
order to consume the goods immediately himself, or one intending to stock 
them and sell them to other merchants in the future. Valencia believes that 
in the latter case, the grain merchant is held to make restitution because of 
the damage the purchaser incurs. Juan de Lugo will later criticize his older 
colleague for having taken this viewpoint, no doubt because it is difficult to 
square with the speculative activities regularly going on in professional markets.
With Luís de Molina, Leonardus Lessius, and Juan de Lugo we enter the 
heydays of Jesuit legal and moral thought as transmitted to us in their treatises 
De iustitia et iure89. Although two issues were to become predominant in their 
reflections on the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, namely lying, and insider trading, 
their highly developed casuistry about the pre-contractual duties to inform 
about future market conditions is not identical.
For example, in the wake of Aragón they share a common commitment to 
a consistent application of the theory of just pricing in the case of the ‘Mer-
chant of Rhodes’, repeating time and again that individual knowledge is 
irrelevant as to the common estimation which ultimately determines justice 
in contractual affairs. But Lessius’ express insistence on the fact that it is not 
significant that the common estimation is based on mistake and ignorance 
(etiamsi ista aestimatio ex errore vel ignorantia procedat), is certainly remark-
able90. Lugo’s claim that there is no information problem in the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’ because of the extrinsic nature of future market circumstances 
(vitium est extrinsecum) is in line with the teachings of Córdoba, Lessius, or 
Molina, but the tenacity with which Lugo insists, from the outset, on the 
89 Ludovicus Molina, De iustitia (supra, n. 67), tom. 2, disp. 354, cols. 616–622, Leonardus 
Lessius, De iustitia (supra, n. 72), lib. 2, cap. 21, dub. 5, p. 278–280, Johannes de Lugo, De 
iustitia (supra, n. 71), tom. 2, disp. 26, sect. 8, p. 332–338.
90 See Leonardus Lessius, De iustitia (supra, n. 72), lib. 2, cap. 21, dubit. 10, p. 284, num. 180.
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non-obligation of disclosure of knowledge about future scarcity or abundance, 
and his consistent distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic circumstances 
to a contract, is exclusive. Lugo is also much more avid to enter into a discus-
sion with his predecessors than Lessius or Molina, who mainly limit their 
criticism to Medina. He again picks up Córdoba’s question of the relevance 
of private information about future market conditions in the event that no 
price is established and argues that public authorities are under an obligation 
to disclose their private knowledge about future abundance or scarcity in 
establishing the price of a new commodity, or in re-establishing the price of 
an old. For civil servants, judges, and princes have a duty to nurture common 
welfare through all means and information at their disposal.
This brings us to the issue of insider trading, which we have seen underlying 
Bartolus de Saxoferrato’s discussion of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’.
The issue is likely to have gained increasing interest among the Jesuits for 
the merely practical reason that they themselves got deeply involved in pub-
lic administration as private counsellors and confessors. To Molina, Lessius, 
and Lugo, the question is whether a merchant who has obtained precious 
information about a change in the regulations concerning, for example, the 
grain market, could speculate on that information, by selling more grain 
(plus) than he had originally intended at the current high price.
Molina soundly condemned a merchant who speculated on such insider 
information. Claiming support from the Portuguese jurist Aries Pinellus91, 
who taught at Coïmbra and Salamanca, Molina drew a distinction between 
information that should be imparted to all members of the community, on 
the one hand, and information which an individual is allowed to possess 
privately, on the other. Moreover, a decree or law is a typical example of 
knowledge that should be known by the whole community (lex publica aequalis 
ac communis esse debet subditis omnibus), and, therefore, should not be a source 
of personal enrichment. Of course, if the merchant refrains from speculating 
on his insider information, and simply sells the goods he initially intended 
91 Aries Pinellus, De rescindenda venditione, cum annotationibus Emanuelis Soarez, Rinthelii 
1667, part. 3, cap. 2, num. 22–24, p. 418–419. Pinellus mentions that Fulgosius disagreed 
with Bartolus’s condemnation of a merchant making profits on the basis of insider information. 
Fulgosius argued, according to Pinellus, that a contracting party should be allowed to use his 
careful cleverness (astutia et diligentia) to his own advantage. Pinellus, however, thinks it is 
safer to follow the common opinion based on Bartolus. What is more, Pinellus thinks that in 
the court of conscience, as opposed to the forum externum, the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is never 
allowed to make profits on the basis of his dominant knowledge position, even if knowledge 
does not concern the enactment of a future decree. He expressly defends Cicero’s view. Molina 
clearly has no legitimate claim to authoritative support from Pinellus, then. For scant biographical 
details on Pinellus, whose work is full of references to the humanist jurists, as well as to the 
early modern theologians and commentators in the Bartolist tradition, see V. Herrero Mediavilla 
(ed.), Indice biográfico de España, Portugal e Iberoamérica, 4th edition, vol. 8, München 2007, 
p. 4122, s.v. Pinello, Arias.
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to bring onto the market, he can safely demand the current price. For he 
should not suffer damage by knowing of the future enactment before the rest 
of the community. Consequently, in Molina’s opinion, the conclusions 
concerning the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ cannot be applied without qualification 
to the case of insider trading. In speculating, the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ does 
not appropriate to himself knowledge of a fact which should be commonly 
known. Rather, his profit-making is based on his industry, business acumen, 
and good luck (spectat ad industriam, artem atque eventum fortunae).
Contrary to Molina, however, Lessius and Lugo hold that taking advantage 
of insider information about a future decree is allowed, even if it is to the 
detriment of other citizens. They simply ignore the distinction drawn by 
Molina between different types of knowledge. Lessius states that, contrary to 
a civil servant, a citizen is not expected nor under an obligation to promote 
the benefit of others. Crucially, he now transfers the laws of gaming, highlighted 
and defended by Covarruvias, to the purchase-sale contract – a telling move 
which reveals Lessius’ all permeating idea of business as a game92. Since it is 
allowed for a card player to raise stakes on seeing that he has a good hand, 
by the same token, a businessman should be allowed to sell a surplus when 
fortune smiles upon him. Moreover, Lessius argues in a most liberal vein, 
that there is no law forbidding the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ to avail himself of 
his insider information about a future enactment. Hence he is allowed to 
speculate on it.
Juan de Lugo even goes a step further. He believes that civil servants or 
public authorities can themselves take advantage of their insider information 
about a future change in the regulations. For even though decrees should be 
to the advantage of all, knowledge of them prior to their promulgation can 
be used for private purposes. What is more, instead of abuse of power, Lugo 
considers these speculative activities by the administration itself as pertaining 
to economic prudence (est actus prudentiae oeconomicae). He merely forbids 
civil servants to try and obstruct the promulgation of the decree (ex industria 
differre legis promulgationem) in order to extend the period in which they can 
benefit of their private knowledge.
Similar differences in considering pre-contractual duties to inform about 
extrinsic circumstances are to be found in the three Jesuits’ respective assessment 
of lying.
Molina is careful to stress that using lies, deceit, and fraud is strictly 
forbidden. His opinion is succinct, clear and does not even admit of a brief 
consideration about the issue of white lies. In solving the four specific cases 
mentioned by Medina, Molina affirms time and again that a seller can exercise 
his right by selling at the current price (iure suo uti), precisely on the condition 
that lies and fraud are absent (sine mendaciis et aliis fraudibus). Lessius, on 
92 Leonardus Lessius, De iustitia (supra, n. 72), lib. 2, cap. 21, dubit. 5, p. 279, num. 46–47.
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the other hand, repeats Aragón’s point of view that the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ 
can lawfully make false statements both as a matter of justice and charity in 
order to protect his self-interest when either he or the buyer is going to suffer 
damages because of a future decrease in price. 
Lugo is of the same opinion as Lessius, although his argument becomes a 
little more sophisticated93. He distinguishes between two situations. In the 
first, a buyer makes explicit enquiries into the seller’s knowledge. Still, a seller 
has a right not to disclose his information, according to Lugo (utitur iure suo 
nolendo manifestare quod scit). He can simply make use of mental reservation 
(aequivocatio), telling to the buyer that he does not know anything about the 
future, while adding in his mind that he does not know anything that is 
publicly known. Lugo points out that this is how he interprets Lessius’ 
statements. The second situation Lugo envisages concerns a seller who makes 
radically false statements, or even positively contributes to the spreading of 
distinctly false information about the future market conditions. In that event, 
the agreement is null in favour of the buyer on account of deceit causing the 
contract (dolus causam dans).
4. – Reception in the Protestant natural law tradition
4.1. – Intrinsic defects
As is generally acknowledged, the writings of the early modern scholastics 
have left their traces in the works of Hugo de Groot (Grotius, 1583–1645). 
This certainly holds good for the paragraphs in the Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
rechtsgeleerdheid where Grotius is dealing with liability for latent defects94. It 
seems that Grotius applies two separate sets of rules. First he uses the distinction 
between dolus causam dans contractui (‘is dat ghebreck zulcks dat waerschijnelick 
de koop daerom zoude zijn achterghebleven’) and dolus incidens (‘zoo de koop 
waarschijnelick even-wel voort-gang zoude hebben gehad’). In the first case 
the sale can be rescinded, in the second the buyer can claim reduction of the 
selling price. Subsequently, Grotius raises an objective utility requirement, 
closely resembling that of Molina and his followers. Grotius speaks about a 
defect which makes the merchandise less useful for its usual purpose (‘indien 
‘t gebreck zodanig is dat de zaeke daer door tot haer gewoonelicke ghebruick 
onbequamer is’). There is, however, a minor difference between this formula 
and the one in Molina, namely that in Grotius’ text it is not stated that the 
defect should not render the merchandise considerably less useful. Moreover, 
although the influence of Molina’s utility concept is clearly present, Grotius 
93 Johannes de Lugo, De iustitia (supra, n. 71), tom. 2, disp. 26, sect. 8, p. 337, num. 145.
94 See Hugo Grotius, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid, III.15.7 (ed. F. Dovring, 
H.F.W.D. Fischer, E.M. Meijers, Leiden 1965, p. 245–246).
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is probably talking here about the situation where the seller himself is not 
aware of the defects. This appears from the last lines of Grotius’ fragment, 
where he states that if the seller, apart from what is stated before, knew the 
defects at the time the sale was concluded, he is beyond doubt liable for all 
damages, including consequential losses. In the early modern scholastics, 
however, the central question – should the seller disclose the defects? – 
presupposes that the seller is aware of these defects. Anyhow, when the defect 
renders the object less useful for its usual purpose (and the seller was not 
aware of the defect), the buyer has, according to Grotius, the choice between 
claiming rescission of the contract and price reduction. This is entirely in 
conformity with the Roman law provisions where the seller is in good faith. 
The same can be said for the features of the remedy for price reduction, as 
described by Grotius. It has to be brought within one year like the Roman 
law aedilitian actio quanti minoris, which in the Gloss is termed as actio quanti 
minoris pretoria. As concerns the other Roman law remedy for the same 
purpose, namely the actio empti, which in the Gloss is termed as actio quanti 
minoris civilis95, it had been disputed whether it was annual in duration or 
perpetual. Grotius does not mention the remedy by its Roman name, but in 
his day the prevailing opinion was probably that the civil actio empti, when 
used for price reduction, prescribes in one year. Moreover, the assessment of 
price reduction can, according to Grotius, be achieved in two ways: it is either 
the shortfall between the selling price and what the buyer would have paid 
if he had known the defect (‘zulckes deels des koopsgelds, als hy de zaeck 
minder zoude hebben ghekocht’) or the shortfall between selling price and 
market value (‘zulcks deels als de zaeck inder daed minder waerdig was’). The 
first method of assessment, taking the pretium singulare as starting point, 
Grotius derived from the actio empti96, the second way, taking the pretium 
commune as starting point, from the aedilitian actio quanti minoris97. As one 
can notice, Grotius was building on various authoritative traditions. Early 
modern scholasticism was certainly one of those, but not the only one.
Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), who from 1661 until 1686 was 
teaching at the University of Heidelberg, also dealt with questions related to 
defective merchandise. Unlike Grotius, however, the influence of early modern 
scholastic concepts is less clear. It is mainly the principle of just pricing which 
appears to be a determinative factor. First Pufendorf points out that the one 
who by means of a contract is about to transfer an object to another, is obliged 
not only to indicate the qualities but also the defects of his merchandise, 
namely as far as he is familiar with these. Otherwise it would not be possible 
95 See the gloss Essem empturus ad D. 19,1,13pr.
96 See D. 19,1,13pr.: ‘(…) quanti minoris empturus esset, si … scisset (…)’; and C. 4,49,9: 
‘(…) quanto, si scisset emptor ab initio, minus daret pretii (…)’.
97 See D. 21,1,38: ‘(…) quo minoris cum venirent fuerint (…)’; and D. 21,1,31,5: ‘(…) quanti 
minoris is homo sit (…)’.
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to determine the just price. This rule is, subsequently, substantiated by 
quotations from Cicero, St Ambrose, Lactantius (ca. 250–320) and Plato (ca. 
428–347 BC)98. Further, it is stated that this obligation follows from the 
nature of the act itself, not from positive law99. Moreover, it is of no importance 
to indicate defects which are known to the buyer. Both parties have in this 
respect an equal position. This is also true in case of defects which the seller 
has shown to the buyer: then the buyer no longer has a reason to ask for 
rescission of the contract100.
4.2. – Extrinsic defects
Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf both touched upon the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’101.
Explicitly referring himself to the early modern scholastics and the Medi-
eval legal tradition, Grotius made a distinction in his De iure belli ac pacis 
between pre-contractual duties to inform about defects in the merchandise 
on the one hand and knowledge about external circumstances on the other 
– a distinction later adopted by Pufendorf too. Continuing the ‘rights-talk’ 
of the early modern scholastics, he did not think it to be necessary, according 
to the principles of justice, that a seller communicates his knowledge in the 
latter case. For not communicating his knowledge infringes no-ones right. 
Unfortunately, Grotius only briefly suggests that the behaviour of the ‘Mer-
chant of Rhodes’ often goes against the rule of charity, but does not clarify 
his statement. It might seem that Grotius would have taken a tougher stand 
on this than the early modern scholastics in the tradition from Aragón till 
Lugo.
Pufendorf, on the other hand, clearly takes a position as to the charity 
point of view. Typical of the trend towards secularization in Pufendorf’s work 
is the re-appearance of the concept of ‘charity’ in the form of ‘the law of 
beneficence and humanity’ (lex beneficentiae et humanitatis). According to 
Pufendorf, there are three main reasons denying, from the point of view of 
the law of humanity, that the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ is obliged to disclose his 
knowledge. First, in order for an obligation to arise from the law of humanity, 
it is necessary that another person is really in need of beneficence. Now the 
latter is obviously not the case with the purchasers in the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, 
because from Antiquity the inhabitants of Rhodes were renowned for their 
wealth. So although they might be in need of grain, they certainly were not 
98 Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, part 2, lib. 5, cap. 3, par. 2, p. 467–468 (ed. 
F. Böhling), Berlin 1998.
99 Pufendorf, ibid., par. 3, p. 468–469.
100 Pufendorf, ibid., par. 5, p. 470.
101 See Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, lib. 2, cap. 12, par. 9 (ed. B.J.A. De Kanter 
- Van Hettinga Tromp; annot. R. Feenstra et C.E. Persenaire), Aalen 1993, p. 344–345, and 
Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium (supra, n. 98), lib. 5, cap. 3, par. 4, p. 469.
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in need of money or any other beneficence. Secondly, Pufendorf holds that 
a duty of beneficence cannot arise if by telling the truth one incurs expenses 
which exceed the benefit accruing to the other party. Now if the ‘Merchant 
of Rhodes’ discloses his information, the loss in profits he suffers will exceed 
the increase in gain for a plurality of buyers. His third and last argument 
recalls Lessius’ sharply drawn distinction between the logic of the market and 
the logic of gift: usual business practice does not aim to be beneficent. 
Grotius and Pufendorf do not take the controversial view of some early 
modern scholastics that making false statements or lying is permitted both 
as a matter of justice and charity for the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’ to avoid a loss.
5. – Conclusion
Responding to the widely attested emphasis across European jurisdictions 
on the present day duty to inform, this paper set out to clarify a decisive 
historical period in the formulation of the problem of the legal relevance or 
insignificance of certain information disparities between contracting parties: 
that is early modern scholasticism. Significantly, early modern theologians 
and jurists came to apply in a consistent manner the distinction between two 
types of defect, namely those intrinsic and those extrinsic to the purchase-sale 
contract. We have seen a good example of this dichotomy in the writings of 
the Franciscan Antonio de Córdoba. On the one hand, there are intrinsic 
conditions that are constitutive for the just price. On the other, there are 
circumstances to a contract that determine a just price extrinsically and by 
extraneous circumstance.
Contrary to extrinsic defects, duties to inform about intrinsic defects still 
determine the agenda of present day contract doctrine. If the volume edited 
by Sefton-Green is indicative, this is true of present day Europe more than 
ever before. It may be contrary to all expectations to find that the early modern 
scholastics, mostly moral theologians by education, put less emphasis on the 
duty to inform about intrinsic qualities of the merchandise than we do 
nowadays. In their debates on intrinsic defects, they judge the necessity of 
the duty to inform by surprisingly liberal standards. Generally speaking, they 
are not prepared to demand that a seller always spontaneously discloses the 
known intrinsic defects in his merchandise, an omission which according to 
Roman law results in full contractual liability. This becomes more apparent 
as the sixteenth century progresses.
The starting point was Aquinas’ short statement that latent defects should 
be mentioned when they could cause damages or risk of danger. Hardly any 
scholar ventured to interpret this rule in an a contrario way, i.e. by stating 
that whenever there was no chance of damages or danger, the seller was free 
to deceive the buyer. All late scholastic writers appear to agree that the rule 
as phrased by Aquinas was too simplistic to be applied directly and that a 
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refinement of the statement, consisting in one or more further conditions, 
was appropriate. In so doing they borrowed concepts from the civilian tradition, 
although they never adopted the Roman law principle that any malicious 
conduct on the part of the seller results in liability. The initial approach which, 
building on both ius commune and Aristotelian ideas, considered that dolus 
dans causam contractui made the buyer’s consent involuntary and, as a con-
sequence, the contract void, soon gave way to a new criterion, not derived 
from Roman law.
Soto added the criterion that the defect should not render the object sold 
unusable for the specific needs of the particular buyer entering into the 
contract. This subjective utility criterion was developed into an objective 
utility requirement by Molina. He stated that the seller is under a duty of 
disclosure if the defect is likely to render the object sold unusable for its 
normal and ordinary purpose. Almost immediately, however, this rule was 
restrictively interpreted. Indeed the seller had to mention latent defects, but 
not minor defects, as stated by Molina himself, and not when the buyer was 
relying on his own judgement, as taught by Lessius. At the same time it 
became increasingly apparent in the Jesuit writers of the late sixteenth century 
and the beginning of the seventeenth century that the context of their teachings 
is a market with professional or at least equally strong parties.
It is not in the least because of their increasing recognition of the profes-
sionalism of the market and the autonomous rules of the business game that 
the early modern scholastics definitively considered that extrinsic defects did 
not constitute knowledge that should be disclosed. They did so in their 
commentaries on the case of the ‘Merchant of Rhodes’, which, through 
Thomas Aquinas and Saint Ambrose, they borrowed from Cicero. Except for 
the dissident voices of Summenhart and Medina, the early modern scholastics 
generally acknowledged that a seller could take advantage of his knowledge 
about future market circumstances without having to disclose about them to 
the buyer. Significantly, we saw Lessius applying Covarruvias’ image of the 
implicit rules of good deceit and speculation in gaming contracts to ordinary 
purchase-sale transactions.
Special cases that gained increasing interest with the Jesuits Molina, Lessius, 
and Lugo concerned the questions of insider trading and lying when the seller 
was asked by the buyer to disclose information about future market conditions. 
Although Bartolus de Saxoferrato had expressed serious doubts about an 
insider taking advantage of knowledge about the enactment of a future decree, 
the Jesuits gradually took a more realistic stand by allowing that to a certain 
extent businessmen made profits through learning from contacts in the 
administration about changes in statutory law concerning the market.
To sum up, then, by relying on their market insight and on rational argu-
ments, the early modern scholastics succeeded in transforming what was still 
thought to be a troubling question, originally raised by the famous rhetorician 
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and jurist Cicero, into a simple fact: information about future market cir-
cumstances is one of the basic profit-making instruments of an industrious 
businessman. Therefore, a seller cannot possibly be expected to be under a 
duty to communicate that kind of knowledge to his rival, to employ Mair’s 
telling metaphor of business as a contest. It is small wonder, then, to find 
that once the problem had been settled for good by the scholastics, the 
problematic character of the question of the duty to inform about extrinsic 
defects seems to have largely disappeared from the horizon of later jurists like 
Pufendorf and Savigny.
Generally speaking, the moral-juridical debates of the early modern scho-
lastics are clearly pervaded by the maxim, expressed for the first time in 
eighteenth century treatises on Anglo-American law, and frequently suggested 
to have its origin in Roman law102, namely that a buyer should be cautious 
(caveat emptor)103. Time and again they proclaim that it is not the seller’s 
duty to take care of the well-being of the buyer and that he is entitled to 
secure his own interests.
Thus we are facing a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, positive jurists 
at the beginning of the 21st century witness a kind of re-moralization of 
contract law, in the sense that the observance of comparatively lofty standards 
seems to be demanded from sellers knowing about defects in their merchandise. 
On the other hand, moral theologians and scholastics of the 16th and 17th 
centuries seem to have reduced the duty to inform to a strict minimum that 
is nowadays associated with the civilian tradition and thin morality.
The explanations of this liberal turn in early modern scholastic legal and 
moral discourse are manifold104, but two points need emphasizing here.
First of all, the early modern scholastics focussed on what a seller was 
obliged to do in conscience. Positive law only provided some of the concepts 
applied in this area and was used for comparison. But this does not mean 
that early modern scholastic moral thought had lost touch with real life or 
that it had to do with vague moral theory and with lofty dreaming about a 
better world. Due to their daily activity as consultants to businessmen and 
politicians, the 16th and 17th century moral theologians were very much 
engaged in practice, while their idea of ‘conscience’ was of a concrete, realistic, 
and legal nature. For them to know what a man was bound to do in conscience, 
was to observe the virtues of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, albeit often 
shaped in concepts derived from Roman, canon, and statutory law, to the 
real life facts at hand.
102 See, for example, J.A. Crook, Law and life of Rome, London 1970, p. 181.
103 H. Broom, A selection of legal maxims classified and illustrated, Philadelphia 1882 (reprint 
Union, 2000), p. 768–809.
104 For a more extensive analysis, see W. Decock, Lessius and the breakdown of the Scholastic 
paradigm, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 31 (2009), p. 57–78 (esp. p. 69–75).
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Secondly, these scholars and practitioners knew where to draw the line 
between the sphere of justice in exchange and the sphere of charitable love. 
As a basic rule they imposed in conscience on the seller an even more restricted 
duty to inform than required by positive law, namely the mere observance 
of the equality-principle of Aristotle’s commutative justice. In principle it is 
only this standard, which by no means can be characterized as a lofty or vague 
criterion, which has to be observed. Only when these prudent businessmen 
had left the professional market and were dealing with non-professionals, 
definitely if these were considered particularly poor or weak, assertive com-
mercial behaviour and ‘rights-talk’ had to make place for charitable empathy.
